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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays On “Production and Technical Efficiency” 
Douglas Mugabe 
This dissertation examines production and or technical efficiencies in agricultural and energy 
systems. First, I focus on the agriculture system, looking at corn production, which is not only 
grown for food but also an important renewable energy source. Second, I examine 
efficiency and inter-fuel substitution in the production of electricity. Lastly, I examine the role 
of drilled but uncompleted wells in natural gas production.  
The first essay examines production capabilities of smallholder corn farmers following Zimbabwe’s 
fast track land reform program of 2000. This paper accounts for various production frontiers 
to provide more reliable efficiency estimates than can be obtained using traditional parametric 
methods. I also use a semi-parametric model, which allows for flexible production function and 
assumes that exogenous variables directly affect output. I find that observed production 
shortfalls can be significantly mitigated by implementing appropriate government programs that 
focus on gender, age, extension services and inclusion of other crops.  
 The second essay examines efficiency and state level fuel substitution in the US electricity 
generation sector. Previous studies used aggregate data to evaluate fuel substitutability 
implicitly assuming uniformity of policy implications across regions. This can produce biased 
estimates of policy effects at the (sub)regional levels, which can potentially lead to suboptimal 
policy recommendations. Understanding spatial variations in inter-fuel substitution patterns 
across states is important for effective policy design as the response of power producers to 
policies differs depending on technological endowments, fuel availability, environmental 
 
regulation, and institutional contexts.  I apply the recent fixed effects stochastic frontier estimation 
to understand the implications of changes in inter-fuel substitution for technical efficiency. 
Findings demonstrate that regional fossil-fuel utilization in electricity generation depends on fuel 
substitution and the capability of power producers to respond to fuel price changes. These findings 
illustrate the need for careful regional analysis and design of electricity policies, especially given 
anticipated retirements of power generation units. I also find that increase in substitution capabilities 
has positive effects on efficiency and reduction of CO2 emissions. 
 The third essay examines the role of drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) in the US natural gas 
production. Prior studies have used drilling rig activity (measured by rig count) as a major predictor 
of oil and gas production. However, in the last decade, correlation between production and drilling 
rig activity weakened, raising doubts about the suitability of rig count as the major driver. This study 
considers variations in producing, newly completed and drilled but uncompleted wells to understand 
the current production of natural gas. The results show a significant relationship between well 
completion and natural gas output, but the strength of the relationship differs across US regions. 
The weakening of the relationship between drilling rig activity and natural gas production is due 
to the increase in the number of drilled but uncompleted wells, which in turn depends on natural gas 
prices and pipeline capacity. Among other variables examined, oil and gas prices, pipeline capacity 
and well length significantly determine the length of time taken to complete drilled wells.  
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CHAPTER 1.    How efficient is maize production among smallholder farmers in 
Zimbabwe? A comparison of semiparametric and parametric frontier efficiency analyses. 
Abstract 
The controversial Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe 
that redistributes commercially owned farmland to smallholder households has 
caused concerns about the efficiency of agricultural production in the country. 
In this paper, I estimate the efficiency of resource use among smallholder 
farmers in Zimbabwe when producing maize, the staple crop in the country. 
Using both a semiparametric model and a fully parametric stochastic frontier 
model, I find significant production shortfalls for smallholder maize 
production. While labor, capital, and land all significantly affect the total 
output, the estimated mean efficiency score for farms with less than 10 
hectares of land(A1) appears to be under 0.75, and for the entire sample (A1 
and A2) it ranges between 0.595 and 0.772. There clearly exists a great potential 
for maize farmers to improve the technical efficiency and increase the total 
output. Gender and age of the household head, access to extension services, 
and activities for other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of 
smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. I also find that all farms operate 
under increasing returns to scale and that the technical efficiency score tends 
to increase with the level of output.  
Keywords: Stochastic frontier; maize production; Zimbabwe; Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme; contextual variables; semi-parametric model 




Agricultural production is one of the primary economic sectors in Zimbabwe and represents 
the livelihood of most of the poor in the country. However, one of the key inputs to its agricultural 
production, land, had been largely occupied by large-scale commercial farms prior to Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 19801.  Since the 1980s, the Zimbabwean government has been actively pursuing 
land reform and resettlement policies that aim to reverse the racially skewed agricultural land-
ownership pattern. In 2000, the government started the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP), targeting to acquire at least five million hectares of landpreviously owned by large 
commercial farmers for redistribution. Under the FTLRP, A1 and A2 farm models were created, 
replacing large commercial farmers with rural communal farmers2. A1 model farms are small plots 
usually with less than 10 hectares of arable land allocated to farmers, while A2 model includes farms 
with plots typically above 10 hectares grouped into small, medium and large farms (Cliffe et al. 2013). 
Currently, more than 35 percent of arable land in Zimbabwe has been reallocated to smallholder 
farmers among 161,500 families since the implementation of the FTLRP, resulting in 145,000 A1 and 
16,500 A2 farmers (Pallotti and Tornimbeni 2015; Scoones et al. 2011). 
 Traditionally, smallholder farmers are characterized with little or no investment in agricultural 
production due to limited access to agricultural input and output markets, insecurity in land tenure 
systems, opportunities in off-farm employment and imperfection in local agricultural and credit 
markets. As a result, some market analysts and researchers have argued that the efficiency of 
agricultural production in Zimbabwe has deteriorated after the FTLRP, which essentially replaced 
efficiently-run commercial farms with smallholder farms lacking the ability to optimally utilize the 
 
1Shaw (2003) reports that 45 percent of agricultural land in Zimbabwe was occupied by less than 1 percent of the 
population in 1980. 
2Currently, Zimbabwe’s land ownership falls into four categories: communal, old resettlement, A1, and small-scale 




available resources (Cliffe et al. 2013; Davies 2005; Moyo 2004; Zikhali 2010). Indeed, Zikhali (2010) 
evaluated the impact of FTLRP on agricultural production in Zimbabwe and found that beneficiaries 
of the program were reluctant to invest in soil conservation due to a lack of tenure security, adversely 
affecting crop production in the country.3   
A handful of empirical studies have evaluated the technical efficiency of agricultural 
production in Zimbabwe after the implementation of the FTLRP. Bangwayo-Skeete, Bezabih, and 
Zikhali (2010) estimated that beneficiaries of the FTLRP in Mashonaland Central province had an 
average of only 37.3% production efficiency (i.e., the total output relative to the potential output 
possible based on available resources), though this number is considerably higher than communal 
farmers that applied for the program but were rejected. Obi and Chisango (2011) analyzed the 
performance of resettled smallholder farmers under limited mechanization and the FTLRP, finding a 
high degree of inefficiencies in resource use in the smallholder system. Richardson (2004) reported 
that agricultural production in Zimbabwe encountered a 30% drop in 2004 after the FTLRP was 
implemented. Chitiga and Mabugu (2008), on the other hand, found that the output of some 
agricultural commodities (i.e., grains, beans, vegetables, livestock, and forestry) would experience a 
modest increase under the FTLRP if the reform is well managed using a computable general 
equilibrium model.  
With a few exceptions (e.g., Carberry et al. 2013; Ndlovu et al. 2014; Mango et al. 2015), only 
limited attention has been paid to the technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe after the 
FLRTP. Maize is the staple crop in Zimbabwe and is used for both household consumption and 
income generation. In recent years, maize production in Zimbabwe has steadily declined. Data from 
 
3For instance, the offer letter given to the A1 farmers explicitly states that the government may withdraw the offer at any 
time without compensating the farmers for any improvements they made on the land; this provision could disincentive 
A1 farmers from making investment on the land (Matondi 2012). 
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the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2018) suggest that Zimbabwe was a net exporter of 
maize prior to 2001, with the average annual net export exceeding 250 thousand tons in 1961–2001 
but has been a net importer since.4   In 2016, Zimbabwe imported over 800 thousand tons of maize, 
an amount almost equal to its total domestic production (FAO 2018). Like other agricultural 
commodities, one possible contributor to Zimbabwe’s maize output decline is the 2000 FTLRP, which 
has resulted in a significant number of smallholder farms lacking the skills and ability to efficiently 
produce agricultural commodities compared to the previously large-scale commercial farms.  
Among papers that focused on maize in Zimbabwe, Ndlovu et al. (2014) compared the 
efficiency of maize production under conservation versus conventional agriculture, finding that 
though the farmers in conservation agriculture showed significantly higher yield due to technical 
progress, there is no statistical difference in the technical efficiency of maize production between the 
two types of farmers. Carberry et al. (2013) use crop simulation models to determine shortfalls from 
the maximum attainable yield based on existing levels of agricultural inputs, finding that only 28% of 
the maize farmers had a technical efficiency over 0.8, and only 45% had an efficiency score over 0.5. 
Mango et al. (2015), a study closely related to the present paper, estimated that the average efficiency 
of smallholder maize farmers in Zimbabwe could be improved by 35% if the existing resources and 
technology are better used. With regard to the factors considered, they found that the gender of the 
household head, household size, frequency of extension visits, farm size and farm region significantly 
affected technical efficiency.  
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the technical efficiency of 
smallholder maize farming in Zimbabwe after the FTLRP. In particular, I aim to address the following 
 




questions: 1) are land, labor and capital significant in explaining maize production among smallholder 
farmers; 2) are smallholder farmers efficiently producing maize and if not, how much more output 
can be achieved with available resources; 3) what are the determinants of technical efficiency in maize 
production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe? Despite the work by Mango et al. (2015) and 
others, information on maize production efficiency in Zimbabwe, especially after the implementation 
of FTLRP, remains limited. Given the importance of maize in the country’s agricultural sector and 
the overall economy, answering these questions could provide additional information to decision 
makers in both the government and international agencies interested in designing programs to increase 
the country’s maize output, enhance farm household income, improve food security, and reduce 
poverty. Additionally, results from the paper have broad implications beyond maize production in 
Zimbabwe as similar questions are likely to exist in other agricultural sectors, as well as in many less-
developed countries. Similar views are discussed in Mango et al. (2015) on the importance of additional 
empirical research in the technical efficiency of smallholder system after the FTLRP.  
In the following analysis, I employ a recently developed semiparametric model, as well as the 
conventional fully parametric stochastic frontier model to evaluate how far maize production of 
smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe deviates from the efficiency frontier. To identify the determinants 
of technical (in)efficiency, I further allow both models to depend on household characteristics and 
other factors related to maize production. The use of these variables is justified by the underlying 
hypothesis of technical efficiency that farmers with the same production technology and resources 
may produce different levels of output due to heterogeneous managerial skills. Specific variables used 
are determined based on previous literature and data availability, which I defer the discussion to the 
data and results sections. Results suggest that smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe are not efficiently 
using the available resources when producing maize. While labor, capital, and land all significantly 
affect the total output, the estimated mean efficiency score ranges between 0.595 and 0.772 for the 
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full sample and falls below 0.75 when only A1 households are used. There clearly exists a great 
potential for maize farmers to increase the total output by improving the technical efficiency of 
production. I further find that gender and age of the household head, access to extension services, 
and activities on other crops significantly affect the technical efficiency of smallholder maize 
production.  
This paper differs from Mango et al. (2015), which also investigated the technical efficiency of 
maize production in Zimbabwe after FTLRP using frontier analysis and cross-sectional data, mostly 
on methodological aspects.5  Mango et al. (2015) used the conventional fully-parametric stochastic 
frontier model with a Cobb-Douglas production function, which may suffer from model 
misspecification as discussed in Giannakas, Tran, and Tzouvelekas (2003). The semi-parametric 
approach I adopt, on the other hand, does not impose a specific production technology in the 
estimation but selects the most appropriate function based on the data. The two methods also differ 
in the way factors contributing to technical inefficiency are accounted for in the analysis. In the 
parametric model, these contextual variables are assumed to affect the total output indirectly by 
altering the inefficiency term. In the semiparametric model, by contrast, these variables are assumed 
to affect the conditional expectation structure of the efficiency frontier. Secondly, Mango et al. (2015) 
do not differentiate between the two types of farmers, i.e., A1 and A2, which could display different 
technical efficiencies due to heterogeneity in land, capital, and labor inputs. the paper instead accounts 
for heterogeneous production frontiers for A1 and A2 farms, potentially providing more reliable 
technical efficiency estimates. Moreover, as noted in the data section, the farm households considered 
in the analysis present rather different production patterns as compared to those in Mango et al. 
 
5While Ndlovu et al. (2014) and Carberry et al. (2013) also discuss maize production efficiency in Zimbabwe, the former 
focuses on the productivity and efficiency of maize under conservation agriculture, and the latter analyzed the efficiency 
of maize farmers using crop simulation models without analyzing the factors contributing to the inefficiency. 
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(2015), allowing the paper to provide additional information on the technical efficiency of smallholder 
maize production not already covered in the literature.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 details the two methods 
(parametric and semiparametric stochastic frontier models) used for the analysis. Section 1.3 describes 
the data, and results are presented in Section 1.4. Concluding remarks and policy suggestions are given 
in Section 1.5. 
 
1.2 Methods 
In this section I first briefly describe the parametric stochastic frontier model commonly used 
for technical efficiency analysis, and then explain in detail the recently developed semiparametric 
model that relaxes the assumption of fixed production technology and allows the contextual variables 
to affect the efficiency frontier directly. 
1.2.1. Parametric Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
In a seminal paper, Farrell (1957) introduced a framework to measure production inefficiency 
that uses the frontier production function as a benchmark. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) independently developed the parametric stochastic frontier 
approach so that deviations from the production frontier are a result of both technical inefficiency 
and random disturbance. Equation (1.1) shows the parametric stochastic frontier model assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
` yi = α + xiβ + vi − ui, i = 1,...,n,                                         (1.1) 
where yi is the output (on log) by unit i, xi is a vector of input variables (on log) and α and β are the 
parameters to be estimated. The error term consists of two elements: v measures the idiosyncratic 
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disturbance due to measurement errors and represents the classical noise, and u measures a one-sided 
disturbance that captures technical inefficiency (ui > 0). The random error term v is assumed to follow 
a two-sided normal distribution (i.e., v ∼ iid N(0,σv2)), while u is distributed half-normally on the non-
negative part of the real number line (i.e., ui ∼ iid N+(0,σu2)). The production function f(·), defining the 
maximum output that can be achieved given the inputs x, is assumed to be identical for all units i. 
To estimate the determinants of technical (in) efficiency, Equation (1.1) is modified to allow 
the inefficiency term ui to linearly depend on exogenous (or contextual) variables zi, as in Equation 
(1.2): 
ui = ziδ + wi,                                                                     (1.2) 
where δ is a vector of parameters for the determinants of technical inefficiency, w is the truncation of 
the N(0,σu
2) distribution such that wi > −ziδ, and u is a non-negative truncation of the N(ziδ,σu
2) 
distribution (Battese and Coelli 1995). This specification takes into account the heterogeneity of each 
individual unit by modeling the mean of the inefficiency term as a function of the contextual z 
variables. As such, it introduces variables into the model that directly affect production efficiency and 
hence indirectly influence each unit’s total output yi (Lensink and Meesters 2014). As also indicated by 
Latruffe (2010), these determinants have to be considered in order to generate heterogeneous levels 
of performance. 
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) are often estimated in one-step by maximum likelihood. While it is 
possible to specify different functional forms for f(·) (e.g., translog), the parametric stochastic frontier 
model is often criticized for its lack of flexibility in defining the production technology. Giannakas, 
Tran, and Tzouvelekas (2003) show that not only the estimated technical efficiency depends on the 
choice of functional specification, but that it may be statistically difficult to select the most appropriate 
production technology among a set of feasible parametric alternatives. In other words, assuming f(·) 
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to belong to a parametric functional family can be too restrictive and sometimes even inappropriate. 
1.2.2. Stochastic Frontier with a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) 
To overcome the a priori specification of the production technology, Fan, Li, and Weersink 
(1996) introduce a two-step pseudo-likelihood procedure to estimate the stochastic frontier model 
where the functional form of the frontier is not known and is obtained via kernel regressions. 
Specifically, the frontier function can be rewritten as: 
 f(xi) = E(yi|xi) + ϕ,         (1.3) 
                       
where ϕ = σu(2/π)0.5  and E(yi|xi) is the conditional expectation of the output that can be consistently 
estimated by any semi or nonparametric method. The problem of correctly specifying f(·) is therefore 
equivalent to estimating the conditional expectation of the output E(yi|xi). 
Following Fan, Li, and Weersink (1996), Vidoli and Ferrara (2015) further extend this 
approach by considering a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) that explains the variability of the 
response using an additive function of the inputs as in the corresponding parametric model. 
Specifically, under GAM the conditional expectation function in equation (1.3) becomes: 
                                                                               p 
 E(yi|xi) = ψ0 +Σ ψj(xij)                           (1.4) 
                                                                                        j=1 
 
where j = 1,2,...,p indicates each input used in the model and the ψ(·)0s are smooth functions 
standardized so that E[ψj(xj)] = 0 (Hastie and Tibshirani 1990). By allowing non-linear dependence 
between inputs and the output, the GAM specification is likely to improve the overall fit of the model 
as compared to the fully parametric specification. Additionally, the model remains fairly 
10 
 
straightforward to interpret: the partial response function ψj plays the same role as βj in the parametric 
model (Equation (1.1)) since both explain how the prediction of response varies as xj changes. 
The nonparametric estimators of the unknown functions ψj in equation (1.4) have one-
dimensional convergence rates (Stone 1986). Since each additive term is estimated using a univariate 
smoother, the estimators are also able to avoid the curse of dimensionality problem commonly present 
with non-parametric models. The fitted functions ψj may help to find suitable simple transformations 
of the input variables and, where possible, to switch to a parametric specification of the model. 
Therefore, the GAM model includes the linear parametric model as a special case where ψj(xj) = βjxj 
but is more general and flexible. Furthermore, the gradients of the non-parametric model can be 
interpreted as partial output elasticities and their sum as the elasticity of scale, similar to the parametric 
model (Henningsen and Kumbhakar 2009). 
1.2.3. Allowing Contextual Variables under the GAM Framework-GAMLSS Model 
In the parametric analysis, the contextual variables indirectly modify the production process 
by affecting the technical inefficiency term ui (equation 1.2). However, as with the production 
technology, there is no general rule defining how the contextual variables should enter the 
input/output relationship–they could influence the productivity or technical efficiency or both. 
Greene (2008) contends that exogenous factors may exert an influence on a producer’s performance 
by directly affecting the production function f(·) itself rather than the efficiency term u with which the 
production process is operating. The lack of consensus on how exogenous variables should be handled 
is evidenced by the variety of approaches employed in the empirical literature (e.g., Johnson and 
Kuosmanen (2011), Florens, Simar, and Van Keilegom (2014) and Mastromarco and Simar (2015)). 
Ferrara and Vidoli (2017) recently proposed a new approach to include exogenous factors 
under the GAM framework by considering the generalized additive models for location, scale and 
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shape (GAMLSS) of Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005). Specifically, a GAMLSS assumes that the 
response variable y ∼ D(y;µ,ω,τ,ν) where D ∈ D can be any distribution, either continuous or discrete, 
and the four parameters (µ,ω,τ,ν) are the location (mean), scale (standard deviation), skewness (shape) 
and kurtosis (shape) of the distribution, respectively. It is also assumed that D may exhibit 
heteroskedasticity, i.e., the scale or shape of the distribution of the response may change with 
explanatory variables. For stochastic frontier models, since the normality assumption is typically 
assumed in the analysis, it is therefore relevant to specify the mean (µ) and scale (ω) of the distribution. 
Based on these assumptions, equation (1.1) under the GAM framework that allows for external factors 
can be re-written as: 
                              yi = Ψ(xi;zi) + vi − ui, i = 1,...,n,           (1.5) 
where the input variables x specifies the conditional expectation µ and the z variables are used as 
additional explanatory variables for the scale of the distribution (ω). Specifically, I assume 
µ = η1 = f1(x), (1.6) 
ω = η2 = f2(z). (1.7) 
where f1(·) and f2(·) are generic functions and each parameter of the distributions can be modeled as 
linear/nonlinear parametric functions and/or smoothing functions of the explanatory variables (e.g., 
cubic splines, penalized splines, lowess) and/or random disturbances. In essence, this approach 
assumes that instead of directly influencing individual technical (in)efficiency, the exogenous variables 
affect the total output by modifying the conditional expectation structure of the frontier. It should be 
noted that a special case under this specification is that the input variables x and contextual variables 
z only linearly affect the total output. The proposed pseudo-likelihood estimators allow flexibility in 
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model selection and capability of imposing monotonicity constraints between each input and the 
corresponding output. The latter property can be imposed using P-spline (Eilers and Marx 1996) for 
the nonparametric modeling of the relevant GAM as illustrated in Bollaerts, Eilers, and Aerts (2006) 
and Muggeo and Ferrara (2008). 
The GAMLSS model for stochastic frontier analysis in equations (1.5)-(1.7) can be estimated in 
two steps6. 
• estimating the conditional expectation E(Y |X = x,Z = z) (i.e. the “mean” frontier) via 
GAMLSS, 
• estimating error term parameters (σv,σu) by pseudo-likelihood estimators of Fan, Li, and Weersink 
(1996). 
Under the GAMLSS framework, the technical efficiency score of each unit can be estimated by 
deriving the conditional distribution of the component u with respect to the compound error ε = v−u 
(Jondrow et al. 1982), which may further be written as: 
 TEi = exp{−uˆi}. (1.8) 
T-tests can be used to determine whether a specific coefficient of the contextual variables is statistically 
significant. Additionally, χ2 test or likelihood ratio test (LRT) can be used to compare the change in 
global deviance to evaluate the statistical significance of anynonlinear term in the GAMLSS 
framework. 
Since there is no ‘best’ approach for efficiency analysis in the presence of contextual variables, 
 
6 A detailed description of the estimation procedure is available in Ferrara and Vidoli (2017). 
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I will employ both methods, namely the parametric model of Battese and Coelli (1995), which I refer 
to as SFA-BC, and the recently-developed semiparametric model of Ferrara and Vidoli (2017), or 
SFA-GAMLSS to estimate the technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe.7  The two 
models differ in their ability to take into account observable heterogeneity and hence, a comparison 
of the two allows us to evaluate the effect of controlling for different kinds of heterogeneity on the 
efficiency estimates and check the robustness of the alternative model. 
 
1.3 Data 
 A survey was conducted in 2014 in three farms (Long Croft, Sweet Valley, and Davaar) in the 
Mazowe district of the Mashonaland Central province in Zimbabwe. Located near Harare (the capital 
city of Zimbabwe, which is also a gateway to international markets), Mazowe is comprised primarily 
of undulating terrain particularly suitable for agricultural production thanks to its largely flat land, 
fertile soils, and plentiful rainfall. According to Chiweshe, Chakona, and Helliker (2015), agricultural 
production in the region is characterized by highly contested new land tenure arrangements, as well as 
a rapid pace of land acquisition/redistribution under various resettlement programs. Wiggins (2016) 
reported that under the FTLRP, the population of Mazowe grew rapidly by 22% from 2002 to 2012 
due to the influx of farmers resettled on former large-scale commercial farms. Because of its large 
agricultural output and heavy influence from government resettlement programs, Mazowe appears to 
be an ideal region to evaluate the agricultural production efficiency in Zimbabwe under the FLTRP.8 
The three farms surveyed are in the same agricultural geographical typological area in the 
 
7The parametric and semiparametric models described in this section can be estimated using the R Environment (R: A 
language and environment for statistical computing 2017) by exploiting the following packages: frontier (Coelli and 
Henningsen 2013), semsfa (Ferrara and Vidoli 2015) and gamlss (Stasinopoulos and Rigby 2007). 
8As pointed out by one reviewer, the study focuses on Mazowe district, one of the most productive Maize production 
regions in Zimbabwe. The analysis presented here is therefore limited in scope as it cannot represent the full picture of 
Maize production in Zimbabwe given the heterogeneity presented across the country. 
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Mazowe district. The sample consists of a total of 113 A1 households who owns less than 10 hectares 
of land and 63 A2 households that owns more than 10 hectares of land. For both types of farmers, 
information collected through questionnaires includes household characteristics, maize output 
realized, inputs (land, capital, and labor) used for maize production and access to extension services. 
The questionnaire also includes information on the type of other crops grown and the cost to produce 
these crops for A1 households.9 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of maize production and household characteristics for 
both A1 and A2 farms in the sample. A2 farmers on average allocated a larger land area, used more 
capital and devoted more labor for maize production as compared to A1 farmers.10 While A2 farmers 
are able to generate a higher per hectare output, the yield difference between the two types of farms 
is not statistically significant. Both A1 and A2 farmers in the sample on average produced maize at 
over 2,000 kg/hectare, which is remarkably higher than the average maize yield of 930 kg/hectare in 
Zimbabwe in 2014 (FAO 2018).11 While the Mazowe district clearly is more productive compared to 
the rest of Zimbabwe, its yield remains significantly lower than the average maize yield in Southern 
Africa (4,762 kg/hectare) and the world (5,622 kg/hectare) in 2014 (FAO 2018), suggesting much 
room for improvement in maize production. 
Per-hectare capital and labor used for maize production are again slightly higher for A2 farms. 
Under the FTLRP, the government could withdraw the land offer to A1 farms without compensating 
the beneficiaries for their capital investment to the land. This provision, however, does not apply to 
A2 farms – the government in fact would provide compensation for A2 farms should they decide to 
 
9These data for A2 farmers were not collected in the survey. 
10Recall that A1 farmers are typically only equipped with less than 10 hectares of land, while A2 farmers often own over 
10 hectares of total land. 




withdraw the land offer. This may explain the slightly higher per hectare capital and labor A2 farmers 
used for maize production than their A1 counterparts, which further contributes to the higher maize 
yield achieved by these farmers. 
Maize production in the sample appears to be volatile. As evidenced by columns 3 and 5 of 
Table 1, almost all variables associated with maize production have large standard deviations. Since all 
farmers covered in the analysis are located in the same agricultural geographical area and the crops 
grown are subject to similar weather disturbances and other random shocks, the large differences in 
maize production indicate a high degree of heterogeneity among farmers depending on individual farm 
household’s ability in utilizing available resources. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Data for Maize Production Efficiency Analysis. 
         
                                                   Mean            Std Dev                  Mean               Std Dev                t-stat 
Maize production 
Total output (kg) 6,172.16 (3,996.40) 12,128.70 (7,552.32) −5.78*** 
Land used (hectare) 2.92 (1.45) 5.50 (2.70) −6.96*** 
Yield (kg/hectare) 2,073.88 (651.27) 2,149.81 (586.95) −0.79 
Capital used (Z$) 982.82 (614.61) 1,954.65 (1,191.64) −6.00*** 
Capital per hectare (Z$) 353.26 (182.77) 373.08 (187.99) −0.67 
Labor used (hours) 217.42 (112.61) 431.71 (223.53) −7.07*** 
Labor per hectare (hours) 76.19 (21.23) 79.78 (23.16) −1.01 
Household characteristics 
Age of household head 56.34 (12.77) 57.12 (12.59) −1.17 





Female 33  17   





No 30  18   
Farmland information 
Total farmland area 6.25 (0.98) 
   
% of area for maize 47.00 (22.58)    
T-stats are calculated for the difference in mean between A1 and A2 farms.   
Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 1 shows rather comparable household characteristics for the two types of farmers. Most 
of the households are male headed (over 70%) with the average age of the household head above 55 
years. Additionally, over 70% of the families have access to extension services, though it does not 
imply that these farmers received extension services.12 The last two rows of Table 1 show the total 
land area used for other crop production. This information is only available for A1 farms. A variety 
of other crops are grown in the region, including soya beans, cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, sugar 
beans, sunflower, etc. Some farmland is also set aside for fallow. On average, A1 households in the 
sample occupied 6.25 hectares of farmland, of which 47% were used for maize production. The second 
most popular crop is soya beans, accounting for 24% of the farmland. 
The household characteristics and other crop variables are used as contextual variables to 
determine the factors affecting technical (in)efficiency of maize production among smallholder 
farmers in Zimbabwe. These variables are selected based on a joint consideration of previous literature 
and data availability. Age of the household is often considered affecting agricultural decisions (Chirwa 
2007; Langyintuo and Mulugetta 2005; Mango et al. 2015), as older farmers tend to rely more on 
experience rather than technology and are sometimes unwilling to accept the newer management 
practices. Gender of the household head is also considered to affect agricultural production due to 
bias placed on women (Abdulai, Nkegbe, and Donkoh 2013; Alene and Manyong 2008; Mango et al. 
2015). Previous literature also suggests that access to extension activities can significantly increase 
technical efficiency (Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder 1991; Mango et al. 2015; Owens, Hoddinott, 
and Kinsey 2003), and that crop diversification can as well affect shortfalls from the production 
frontier (Manjunatha et al. 2013; Solís, Bravo-Ureta, and Quiroga 2009). 
 
12I also collected the education background of household head. However, there is little variability with the education 
variable since most of the household head only received secondary education. 
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Compared to Mango et al. (2015), the households in the sample devoted significantly more 
land for maize production–the average maize area is 0.892 hectares in their study while here, the 
acreage maize area is 2.92 and 5.5 hectares for A1 and A2 farms, respectively. The farmers in the 
present paper also had a higher yield (about 2,000 kg/ha) compared to in Mango et al. (2015) (about 
1,400 kg/ha). The differences in maize production characteristics in the two studies suggest that the 
paper complements the work by Mango et al. (2015), providing further insights into the technical 
efficiency of smallholder maize production after the FTLRP in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.4 Results 
The two models presented in Section 1.2 are applied to the maize production data I collected. 
The quantity of maize produced (y), as well as all inputs (i.e., labor, capital, and land) are converted to 
their logarithmic values. I first analyze the technical efficiency of A1 farmers and then estimate the 
two models by considering both types of farmers.13 Pooling across the two types of farmers is justified 
given the comparable levels of yield, labor and capital investment per hectare and household 
characteristics for A1 and A2 farmers as shown in Table 1. 
Prior to the estimation, I first test the adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas function as compared 
to the corresponding translog specification in the full parametric model (SFA-BC). Results based on 
the Wald test (F ¼ 1:30, p ¼ 0:27) and the likelihood ratio test (χ2 ¼ 8:26, p ¼ 0:22) suggest that the 
translog specification fails to provide additional information on the relationship between the output 
and input variables.14 As a result, I proceed with the more parsimonious Cobb-Douglas specification 
 
13There are 113 A1 farmers and only 63 A2 households. I find the models perform poorly when applied to A2 farmers 
alone, perhaps due to the small sample size. 
14Since the translog model nests the Cobb-Douglas specification, I can use the Wald and the likelihood ratio tests to 
determine whether the former provides a better fit than the latter, more parsimonious model. 
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for the SFA-BC model. The SFA-GAMLSS model is estimated by imposing the monotonicity 
constraint for the inputs under the p-splines framework, and likelihood ratio tests (LRT) are used to 
evaluate the statistical significance of anynonlinear term. 
1.4.1. Results for A1 Sub-Sample 
Estimation results using A1 households alone are reported in Table 2. Both models suggest 
that all three inputs, namely, land, labor, and capital, are significant in explaining the total output. The 
parametric model (SFA-BC) indicates increasing returns to scale as evidenced by the larger than unity 
of the sum of the three estimated coefficients (0.483 + 0.552 + 0.128 = 1.163). The elasticity of maize 
production is the highest with respect to labor (0.552), followed by land (0.483) and capital (0.128). 
Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 For the semiparametric model (SFA-GAMLSS), the gradients of the dependent variable 
(logarithmic output quantity) with respect to the explanatory variables (logarithmic input quantities) 
can be interpreted as partial output elasticities. Unlike the SFA-BC model, the semiparametric 
specification allows (marginal) effects of the explanatory variables to differ between observations 
Table 2: Stochastic Frontier Model Estimation Results for A1 Farm Households. 
 SFA-BC SFA-GAMLSS 
 Est SE Pr(>|z| ) LRT/Est SE Pr(Chi)/Pr(>|t |) 
Production function 
Intercept  4.639 0.597 0.000***  8.544 0.021 0.000*** 
Land  0.483 0.129 0.000***  138.091  0.000*** 
Labor  0.552 0.127 0.000***  158.592  0.000*** 
Capital  0.128 0.062 0.038**  74.118  0.000*** 
 Est SE Pr(>|z| ) Est SE Pr(>|t |) 
Contextual variables 
Intercept    0.331 0.349 0.343 −1.571 0.375 0.000*** 
Male −0.145 0.105 0.168 −0.295 0.156 0.062* 
Age    0.004 0.004 0.302    0.009 0.004 0.101 
Extension −0.299 0.140 0.033** −0.548 0.162 0.001*** 
Other crops −0.002 0.032 0.959    0.093 0.045 0.040** 




without being restricted by an arbitrarily chosen functional form (Czekaj and Henningsen 2012).15  
These observation-specific output elasticities are reported in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Gradients (output elasticities) estimated by the semiparametric model for various input levels. 
As can be seen in the figure, the estimated output elasticities with respect to land and labor 
fluctuate around the corresponding parameter estimated by the SFA-BC model, while I observe much 
more heterogeneity for output elasticity with respect to capital. Based on these individual elasticities, 
I report the returns to scale implied by the semiparametric model and its relation to the output, as in 
Figure 2. Consistent with the parametric model, all farms operate under increasing returns to scale, 
with the majority of returns to scales ranging between 1.05 and 1.3. Additionally, there exists a U-
shaped relationship between output and returns to scale – farms producing around the median may 
 
15In other words, farms can adopt different production technologies and as a result, observation-specific measures of the 
production technology may be estimated. 
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gain less from increasing inputs compared to the rest of farms. 
 
Figure 2: Elasticities of scale and relationship with farm size obtained by the semiparametric model.  
Turning next to the factors affecting technical efficiency, I can see that the SFA-GAMLSS 
highlights greater statistical significance for all coefficient estimates. In the case of the SFA-BC, only 
the extension service variable is statistically significant in explaining the mean of the technical 
inefficiency (u). By contrast, all contextual variables are significant in the SFA-GAMLSS, though with 
differing levels of statistical significance. With the exception of the intercept and the dummy variable 
for other crop areas, the signs of other contextual variables are consistent across two specifications. 
Overall, the results given by the semiparametric specification are coherent with the relevant literature, 
which I discuss below. 
First, households with an older household head are on average less efficient, perhaps because 
they are in general more conservative than their younger counterparts. Younger farmers should be 
more inclined to adopt new management practices that are able to use the available resources more 
efficiently (Chirwa 2007; Langyintuo and Mulugetta 2005). Older farmers, on the other hand, may rely 




Second, male-headed households appear to be more efficient than female-headed households. 
A large volume of literature has documented the cultural or social biases (e.g., customs, traditions, 
religious beliefs, social norms, etc.) against women that have led to an asymmetric distribution of 
resources and responsibilities, especially in less developed countries (Alene and Manyong 2008; 
Abdulai, Nkegbe, and Donkoh 2013). These biases not only place restrictions on women’s activities 
but also limit their ability to access new information and technologies, weakening their technical 
efficiency in agricultural production as compared to male farmers. Additionally, Doss (2001) 
concluded that based on evidence from 25 years of literature on agricultural production in Africa, 
female farmers are often not contacted by extension services even if they have access to such services, 
further lowering their production efficiency. 
Households who have access to extension services are more efficient in maize production. 
Indeed, extension services not only provide the platform for acquiring new information that promotes 
technology adoption, but also reduce the negative effect due to a lack of formal education in the 
overall decision to adopt new technologies. Owens, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2003) found that access 
to extension services raised farm production by about 15% in resettlement areas of Zimbabwe. 
Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder (1991) show that contact with extension services could raise farm 
efficiency by as high as 27%. the results suggest that among all variables considered, access to 
extension services have the largest impact on technical efficiency. 
Additionally, the results from SFA-GAMLSS suggest that working with other types of crops 
reduces the technical efficiency of maize production for A1 households. While crop diversification is 
often associated with traditional benefits such as increased farm resilience and higher spatial and 
temporal biodiversity, it may be difficult for smallholder farmers to achieve a high yield when engaging 
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in multiple-crop production due to the lack of ability in efficiently managing multiple crops. However, 
the magnitude of this effect is relatively small compared to other contextual variables. 
Efficiency scores implied from the two models are reported in Figure 3. Mean efficiency is 
0.746 for the semiparametric model and 0.738 for the parametric model. The distributions of the 
efficiency scores from the two specifications bear a close resemblance. These results are confirmed by 
the high Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients between the efficiency scores from the two 
models, which are equal to 0.927 and 0.777, respectively. 
 
Figure 3: Efficiency score for the two model competitors for A1 farmers: parametric (SFA-BC) and 
semiparametric (SFA-GAMLSS). 
To better understand the results, I analyze the λ parameter which represents the relative 
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variability between the technical inefficiency and the random error, i.e., the relative contribution of v 
and u on ε (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). If λ → 0, the model excludes the presence of technical 
inefficiency and on the other hand, the stochastic frontier model degenerates into a Deterministic 
Frontier Analysis (DFA) type if λ → +∞, (Aigner and Chu 1968), where every departure from the 
frontier is due only to technical inefficiency. For the SFA-BC (parametric) model I find that λ = 3.404 
while for the SFA-GAMLSS (semiparametric) model λ = 2.109, both suggesting the greater 
importance of technical inefficiency than random disturbances in production shortfalls from the 
frontier. The higher value of λ in the SFA-BC model can be explained by the fact that the 
semiparametric model captures more variability associated to the inputs and to the contextual variables 
in the conditional expectation structure of the frontier. 
1.4.2. Full Sample Analysis using both A1 and A2 Households 
Next I consider the full sample that includes both A1 and A2 farmers. I estimate the same 
models as those specified and reported in Table 2 except for excluding ‘otherarea’ variable in the 
technical efficiency equation and adding a dummy variable indicating the type of farmers (A1 = 1) in 
the mean equation. Results are reported in Table 3. 
As can be seen in Table 3, with the only exceptions of the type of farms and capital investment the 
semiparametric and fully parametric models highlight similar statistical significance for all other 
coefficient estimates. Estimation results suggest that A1 farmers have a slightly lower mean. output as 
compared to A2 households, and this difference is statistically significant in the SFA-GAMLSS model. 
With regard to the contextual variables, I find that access to extension services is the only factor 
statistically significant for both models. The λ for SFA-BC is close to the boundary of the parameter 
space, which may be attributable to model misspecification or again, to a less flexible specification in 
the production function. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for A1 and A2 Farm Households. 
 SFA-BC SFA-GAMLSS  
Production function       Est 
 
SE Pr(>|z|) LRT/Est SE Pr(Chi)/Pr(>|t| ) 
Intercept     5.389  0.392 0.000*** 8.832 0.024 0.000*** 
Type (A1 = 1) -0.053  0.047 0.254 -0.088 0.040 0.028** 
Land 0.579  0.083 0.000*** 295.701  0.000*** 
Labor 0.499  0.076 0.000*** 298.643  0.000*** 
Capital 0.077  0.049 0.114 156.732  0.000*** 
Contextual variables         
Est 
 
SE Pr(>|z|) Est SE Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept  0.569 0.117 0.000*** -1.177 0.274 0.000*** 
Male -0.085 0.063 0.176 -0.051 0.123 0.677 
Age  0.003 0.002 0.162 0.002 0.004 0.689 
Extension -0.168 0.057 0.003** -0.353 0.124 0.005** 
λ 1e+08   1.699 
  
Signif. codes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 The estimated gradients of the dependent variable with respect to each explanatory variable 
for the semiparametric model are reported in Figure 4. As in the sub-sample analysis for A1 farms, I 
observe much more heterogeneity for output elasticity with respect to capital, and that all farms 
operate under increasing returns to scale with most farms having an elasticity of scale around 1.1. 
Unlike the sub-sample analysis of A1 farms, efficiency scores generated from the two models for the 
full sample are quite different – the mean efficiency scores are 0.772 and 0.595 for the SFA-GAMLSS 
and SFA-BC, respectively. The disparity can be partly attributed to the different statistical significances 
associated with the type of farm and the capital investment variables in the mean equation in the two 
models. The higher efficiency scores generated from the SFA-GAMLSS specification may also be a 
result of its ability to accommodate heterogeneous technologies when estimating the mean equation 




Figure 4: Output elasticities and elasticities of scale from semiparametric models. 
Finally, I plot in Figure 5 the technical efficiency score for each household against their maize 
output based on the estimation results from both models. As can be seen, the level of technical 
efficiency tends to rise as the output increases, suggesting the need to increase inputs for maize 
production so that higher efficiency can be reached. All in all, the analysis produced some interesting 
results regarding the technical efficiency of smallholder maize production in Zimbabwe. The estimated 
mean technical efficiency score I obtained appears to be higher than in both Mango et al. (2015) and 
Ndlovu et al. (2014), who found the efficiency level to be around 0.65 and 0.68, respectively.  
A possible contributor to the discrepancies is the use of different study areas – while Mazowe, 
one of the most productive areas for maize production in Zimbabwe, is considered in the present 




Figure 5: Efficiency estimated by semiparametric and parametric models against log(output). 
Findings from this paper may, therefore, be considered an upper-bound for maize production 
technical efficiency in Zimbabwe. Regardless, the results are consistent with previous studies that there 
exists a high level of technical inefficiency in Zimbabwe among smallholder maize producers after the 
implementation of the FTLRP. For comparison, Seyoum, Battese, and Fleming (1998) reported that 
the mean technical efficiency score for maize producers in Ethiopia is 0.866. Tchale and Sauer (2007) 
report that the efficiency of maize production in Malawi is 0.91 for farmers applied integrated soil 
fertility management and 0.79 for those who did not. In Cameroon, Binam et al. (2004) find the mean 
technical efficiency of maize production to be 0.75. While these results are clearly dependent upon the 
specific estimation method and data employed, they nevertheless indicate that the efficiency of maize 





In this study, I evaluate the technical efficiency of maize production among smallholder 
farmers in Zimbabwe, an important issue as the country moves from large commercial farm 
agriculture to smallholder production under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). 
Specifically, I seek to answer if smallholder farmers are efficiently allocating their land, labor and 
capital resources when producing maize and what determines variations in efficiency levels after the 
implementation of the FTLRP, a controversial policy that has caused radical changes in the land tenure 
system in Zimbabwe. I find that beneficiaries of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe are not efficiently utilizing 
their available agricultural resources in maize production. The average efficiency level appears to be 
under 0.75 when only A1 farms are considered. When both types of farmers are included, the average 
efficiency of maize production among smallholder farmers is 0.772 for the semiparametric 
specification and 0.595 for the fully parametric model. Among other things considered, gender and 
age of the household head, access to extension services and activities of other crops significantly affect 
farmers’ efficiency levels. Results suggest a large output improvement potential if the farmers can 
adopt more advanced management practices and use the available resources more efficiently. 
This paper complements existing studies on the technical efficiency of maize production in 
Zimbabwe after the implementation of FTLRP, providing additional insights into ways that can raise 
maize productivity that has fallen rapidly over the past decade. From a methodological point of view, 
the semiparametric stochastic frontier production model employed in the present analysis represents 
a significant improvement over the fully parametric stochastic frontier models commonly used in 
agricultural technical efficiency analyses (e.g., Mango et al. 2015). The SFA-GAMLSS specification 
not only allows for flexible production functions, but also assumes that exogenous variables affect the 
individual output by affecting the conditional expectation structure of the production frontier. Since 
the true form of the frontier is rarely known and in practice, it is impossible to measure how well any 
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chosen functional form approximates the true production function, the semiparametric model could 
allow a more precise estimation of the frontier. Additionally, the failure to model the exogenous 
factors in the conditional mean equation as in Battese and Coelli (1995) may lead to biased estimation 
of the production frontier model and the level of technical inefficiency. 
This paper points to the importance of developing conducive policies to encourage investment 
in maize production as both types of farmers demonstrate increasing returns to scale. Policies should 
be made to allow for easy access to key inputs such as fertilizers and machinery, as well as agricultural 
credits to allow further investment. Additionally, securing the land tenure system could also greatly 
increase the total output as smallholder farmers may be reluctant to make land conservation or other 
capital and labor investments under the current land redistribution policy. The resulting agricultural 
intensification can further improve maize production efficiency as supported by the positive 
relationship between the technical efficiency score and the level of output found by both 
semiparametric and fully parametric models. 
Given the significant role of extension services in lowering technical inefficiency, there is a 
great need to expand extension access and encourage more extension visits to farmers. Extension 
services only help farmers make better use of existing resources by improving their management skills 
but may also increase the output by encouraging farmers to devote more capital and labor for maize 
production. the analysis also points to the need for implementing innovative extension practices based 
on a gender equitable approach. Jiggins, Samanta, and Olawoye (1997) noted that providing female 
farmers access to extension services not only improves these farmers’ agricultural output, but also 
boosts the efficiency of the overall agricultural sector and enhance the national food security. Some 
previous studies reported evidence of a diminishing gap between female and male-headed households 
when the extension service agents employ a large number of women extension agents Alene and 
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Manyong (2008). Results of the present study suggest that policymakers should aim to reduce gender 
gaps, to increase access to agricultural advisory services, and to stimulate younger household in 
agricultural production since they may be more open to new management practices.  
Although improving technical efficiency could boost maize output in Zimbabwe, it is also 
critically important for the government and other international organizations to invest in research and 
technology development. Productivity growth, as is well established in the literature, can be attributed 
to both technical change and technical efficiency. While improving technical efficiency can enhance 
maize output given the existing production technology, technical advances will shift the production 
frontier outward and increase the total output possible given the existing resources. Policymakers 
should strive to improve the macroeconomic environment for agricultural production, facilitating 
technology transfers from developed economies and stimulating research and technology 
development. Furthermore, a conducive general economic environment also helps attract attracting 
investment into the agricultural sector, further improving total maize output. 
One limitation of the paper is that I only consider the farm households in Mazowe, one of the 
most productive regions for maize production in Zimbabwe. Given the heterogeneous nature of maize 
production in the country, results presented in the paper cannot provide the full picture of technical 
efficiency of smallholder maize system in Zimbabwe. Results obtained in this study may therefore be 
best considered an upper bound for technical efficiency of maize production in Zimbabwe after the 
FTLRP. Future study may wish to use a sample representative of the entire Zimbabwean farm 
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The implications of national or regional energy policies for technical 
efficiency and environmental outcomes in electricity generation depend on 
fossil fuel input substitution. This study uses state level data to examine fossil 
fuel (coal and natural gas) substitution in electricity generation under increased 
availability of natural gas in the United States. I observe that changes in 
elasticities of substitution from pre-2009 to post-2009 differ across states 
suggesting that the effects of increased availability of inexpensive natural gas 
on electricity generation have been spatially heterogeneous. I rely on the 
observed heterogeneity to assess the effects of fossil fuel input substitution on 
technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. The results reveal that state level 
elasticity of substitution between natural gas and coal has a positive effect on 
technical efficiency and a negative effect on CO2 emissions. Therefore, future 
policy design and analyses should reflect the implications for regional 
elasticities of fossil fuel substitution and associated environmental outcomes 
Keywords: Elasticity of substitution, electricity, technical efficiency, frontier 
analysis, natural gas, coal. 
 
 










Electricity generation sector has been subject to close regulatory oversight targeting 
competitiveness of electricity markets, grid access, and environmental quality objectives (Ko and Dahl, 
2001). Effectiveness of such policies in part depends on the electric power sector’s adjustment in 
terms of fuel use mix. For example, adjustments in fuel use can influence technical efficiency and 
carbon emissions in electricity generation, which are often targeted by regulatory programs and 
policies (Knittel, 2002, EPA 2019). I examine the changes in regional (state) fossil fuel substitution 
elasticities following increased availability of natural gas from unconventional production in the US. 
Specifically, I examine the implications of changes in regional elasticities of substitution between coal 
and natural gas for technical efficiency and carbon emissions.  
State-level fuel substitution elasticities in the electricity generation sector are important for 
policymaking and planning purposes because policies, institutional and regulatory contexts, resource 
endowments, technology, infrastructure, and the historical development of electric power systems and 
regulatory policies often differ across states. For example, the Midwestern states in the US historically 
have had more coal-fired capacity relative to other states (Dahl and Ko, 1998). As a result, fuel 
consumption and substitution capacities in these states can differ from other states. Environmental 
regulations, like the renewable portfolio standards (RPS), also differ across states (Maguire and 
Munasib, 2016; Palmer and Burtraw, 2005). Additionally, electricity market deregulation differences 
across states led to divergent state level generation technology investment decisions (Csereklyei and 
Stern, 2018), with corresponding regional implication for fossil fuel input substitutability. While the 
importance of regional patterns of substitution has been recognized for policy analysis and evaluation 
(Uri, 1977; Bopp and Costello, 1990; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Gao et al., 2013), state level analysis of 
substitution has been lacking.  
Regional-level substitution among fossil fuels in electricity generation can come from either 
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substitution at individual utilities or substitution across utilities. Substitution at individual utilities 
occurs either through fuel switching or through adjustments in the queuing order of generation 
facilities with varying mixes of fuel consumption. Substitution across utilities takes place through bulk 
transfers of power across utilities within and across regions (Dahl and Ko, 1998). At the state level, 
such substitution capabilities are subject to regulatory parameters and the availability of appropriate 
technology, infrastructure, and resources.  
Implications for technical efficiency are important to examine because regulatory programs 
and policies in the electricity generation sector often seek to improve energy generation efficiency. 
Thermal efficiency-based programs aim to reduce the “heat rate” of generation facilities and thus 
improve generation efficiency (Knittel, 2002; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986). For example, recent 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule relies on 
improvements in heat rates to control emissions of air pollutants from existing generation units (EPA, 
2019). Heat rate, or technical efficiency, measures the amount of energy (Btu) used to generate a unit 
of electricity (kWh). Although the effect of policies and regulations on electric industry performance 
can be examined in terms of measures like trends in electricity rates, technical productive efficiency 
measures provide a more straightforward representation of efficiency (Goto and Tsutsui, 2008). 
Regulations pertaining to the effects of electricity generation on environmental quality have 
attracted significant attention from policy makers because the electric power industry is one of the 
major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. In the US, electricity production constitutes roughly 
one-third of greenhouse gas emissions via fossil fuel consumption (EPA, 2014). Consequently, 
numerous policies have been introduced to improve energy efficiency and/or promote 
renewable/clean energy development initiatives including but not limited to the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, the Climate Action Plan of 2013, the Clean Power Plan (CPP) of 2014, and most recently 
Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule of 2019. In 2015, the EPA finalized the carbon dioxide emission 
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standards for existing and new power plants pursuant to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. The 
guidelines articulated state-specific limits in terms of the amount of carbon dioxide emissions per 
megawatt-hour of net electricity generation, aiming at a 30% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions 
relative to 2005 levels by 2030. Similarly, in 2019, reversing the guidelines of the CPP, the EPA released 
the ACE rule where states are responsible for developing respective performance standards that 
achieve targeted improvements in generation efficiencies at particular types of existing generation units 
(EPA, 2019).   
Changes in fossil fuel supply can have heterogeneous implications for regional electricity 
generation under constrained shipment capacity. According to the estimates of the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), daily production of dry shale gas in the US increased from 2.5 
billion cubic feet in 2002 to 43 billion cubic feet in 2016. The productivity of natural gas wells has 
been steadily increasing because of ongoing improvements in the precision and efficiency of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.  The increase in natural gas availability has had a significant 
impact on electricity generation sector.  
Since 2008, coal consumption in electricity generation has been declining, while consumption 
of natural gas has been increasing (Figure 6). These adjustments are not surprising considering the 
recent increase in the costs of coal-based electricity generation relative to natural gas-based electricity 
generation (Van Kooten et al., 2013).  The growth in the availability of inexpensive natural gas and 
corresponding adjustments in the electricity generation industry, including infrastructure and 
generation capacity, have implications for elasticities of fuel substitution. Observing structural beaks 
in most of the data series in 2009, I examine the differences in fossil fuel substitution elasticities across 
states pre and post 2009 and evaluate corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2 





Figure 6.  Fuel use for electricity production in the US (Million BTUs) 
 
In this study, I focus on the substitution patterns between coal and natural gas as the primary 
fossil fuels used in electricity generation. Although the empirical model includes oil-based generation, 
I focus on coal and natural gas because these fuels represent an overwhelming majority of fossil fuel-
based generation. Ramping capabilities of active fossil fuel power plants have significant implications 
for peaking power generation to meet electricity demand in real-time. Therefore, coal and natural gas 
substitution patterns are important to consider when evaluating or designing state-level policies 




16 I reserve the examination of electricity generation from renewable sources for a later study. While renewable and nuclear 
sources are mainly used for baseload electricity generation, day-to-day fuel substitution comes mostly from fossil fuels 
subject to technological constraints (Dahl and Ko, 1998). Technological improvements in storage and transmission at 
some point in time will allow for more flexibility in renewable energy utilization. However, at this time the opportunity 
for substitution with renewable energy remains limited due to the variable nature of wind and solar energy and due to lack 




First, I use linear panel regression models with shares of coal and natural gas relative to total 
fossil fuels as functions of prices, electricity generation, and renewable energy policy to describe the 
changes in fossil fuel consumption in electricity generation at state scale. Next, I quantify the changes 
in state level elasticities of substitution between coal and natural gas before and after 2009 and examine 
the corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2 emissions.   
2.2.1. Inter-fuel Substitution 
Majority of input substitution studies rely on the translog cost function-based approach to 
quantify elasticities of substitution (Bernstein and Parmeter, 2019; Zhang and Lin, 2019; Jia and Shao 
2018; Wesseh and Lin, 2016; Li and Lin, 2016; Shahiduzzaman and Alam, 2014; Ma et al. 2012; 
Soderholm, 2001; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Griffin, 1977). Limited attention has been given to the 
examination of inter-fuel substitution at sub-regional scales. Using translog specification of the cost 
function for electricity generation and associated cost share equations for coal, natural gas, and oil, 
Gao et al., (2013) studied fuel substitution patterns across seven electricity generation regions in the 
US based on annual region-level data from 2001 to 2008. They show that natural gas was a substitute 
input for coal and oil to various degrees across seven electricity generation regions in the US. Similar 
result was found by Uri (1977). Bopp and Costello, (1990) also used fuel share equations based on 
translog specification of the cost function to examine elasticities of coal, gas, and oil use nationally 
and across five regions in the US. They show that regionally explicit estimation is superior to national 
level modeling in terms of revealing the underlying economics of electricity generation.   
I follow prior literature to examine changes in fuel substitution elasticities obtained from a 
translog specification of the cost function. Given a production function Y=f(X), elasticity of 
substitution, originally introduced by Hicks (1932), measures the change in the relative factor 
proportion Xi/Xj in response to the change in relative marginal rates of technical substitution fXi/fXj 
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holding output Y constant, where fXi and fXj are partial derivatives of the production function with 









 = .  
In this study, the Allen partial elasticities of substitution, expressed in terms of cost function and its 
derivatives, are used as /ij ij i jCC C C = , where subscripts indicate partial derivatives with respect to 
prices of inputs, i and j (Allen, 1938; Uzawa, 1962; Cristensen and Green, 1976; Dasgupta and Roy, 
2015). 
Following Shephard’s Lemma, (1970), cost-minimizing factor demands for a cost function
,( , , , )c G oC f P P P Y t= , are obtained by
* ( , )i ix C Y P=  P , where ,, ,c G oP P P  denote prices of coal, 
natural gas, and oil, respectively, and  , ,i C G O . Alternatively, by logarithmic differentiation, factor 
cost share equations are ln ( , ) lni is C Y P=  P  (Christensen and Green, 1976; Berndt and Wood, 
1975). Following numerous previous studies, I use translog functional form for the cost function to 
obtain factor cost share equations and elasticities of substitution (Griffin and Gregory, 1976; Taheri, 
1994; Berndt and Wood, 1975; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Ko and Dahl, 2001; Bentzen, 2004; Gao et al., 
2013; Linden et al. 2013). The system of the cost function and the corresponding cost-share equations 
is:             



















2 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖
𝑖
   (2.1) 
 
            𝑆𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑌 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                                 (2.2) 
 
 
where C is a vector of state level costs of fossil fuels used in electricity generation over time, Si is a 
vector of cost shares of fuel i across states and over time, Pi and Pj are vectors of fuel prices across 
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states and over time, and Y is a vector of fossil fuel based electricity generation across states and over 
time.  Assuming that price interaction parameters in the cost share equations are a linear function of 
state dummy variables (Ds), the share equations are expressed as follows (Gao et al., 2013) with 
subscript s denoting state. 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑠 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦 𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑠 + ∑ (𝛽𝑜𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑠𝐷𝑠𝑠 ) 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗𝑠                                                             𝑗 (2.3)  
 
In accordance with neo-classical production theory, and following extensive prior literature 
(Linden et al. 2013; Bentzen, 2004; Dahl and Ko, 1998; Ko and Dahl, 2001; Christensen and Green, 
1976), parameter restrictions for homogeneity and symmetry conditions are as follows: 
1i
i
 =  
0iy
i
 =   
0ij ij
j i
 = =    
; ;ij ji oij ijs s oji jis s i i iy iy
s s
D D         
   
= = + = + = =   
   
    
 
The oil share equation is omitted from the estimation17.  Following Berndt and Wood (1975), 
Bentzen (2004), Griffin and Gregory (1976), Bopp and Costello (1990), Dahl and Ko, (1998), and 
numerous other studies, cost share equations (2.3) are estimated as a system of equations. Natural gas 
and coal share equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) for each electricity 
market region independently using state level data with state and time fixed effects and interaction 
effects between prices and fixed effects.  
 
17 Though not necessary for the purposes of this study, the parameter estimates for oil-based fuels can be obtained using 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. 
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Following prior literature (Dasgupta and Roy, 2015; Linden et al. 2013; Bentzen, 2004; Dahl 
and Ko, 1998; Griffin and Gregory, 1976; Christensen and Green, 1976), state specific elasticities of 




                                                                              (2.4)  
 
2.2.2. Technical Efficiency Analysis 
Technical inefficiency refers to production taking place in the interior of the production 
possibility set, i.e., when output falls short of possible attainable level for a given use of inputs (Farrell, 
1957). Non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Barros and Peypoch, 2008; Pacudan and 
de Guzman, 2002; Von Hirschhausen et al., 2006) and parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
(Filippini et al., 2004; Goto and Tsutsui, 2008; See and Coelli, 2012; Knittel, 2002; Von Hirschhausen 
et al., 2006; Hattori, 2002) have been widely used to examine inefficiencies in the electricity industry. 
Unlike SFA, DEA does not impose a specific functional relationship between inputs and outputs and 
does not assume specific statistical distribution of the error structure. However, DEA does not 
account for possible noise in the data and outliers can have a large effect on the result (Bravo-Ureta 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, SFA models deviations from the frontier in terms of both technical 
inefficiency and random errors that are outside of individual producers’ control. Although DEA and 
SFA estimates produce remarkably similar conclusions (Von Hirschhausen et al., 2006; Wadud and 
White, 2000), I use SFA because I am mostly interested in examining the relationship between 
elasticities of substitution and inefficiencies post frontier estimation. In this respect SFA provides a 
more convenient framework than mathematical programming-based DEA. Furthermore, while DEA 




Earlier work on inefficiency with panel data includes Pitt and Lee, (1981) and Kalirajan, (1991), 
where the stochastic frontier estimation was based on panel data. Apart from the ability to separate 
individual and time effects from combined effects in efficiency estimation, the use of panel data also 
avoids problems related to distributional assumptions as observed in cross section analysis (Schmidt 
& Sickles, 1984). Fixed effects panel SFA is defined as follows (Greene, 2005; Chen et al., 2014): 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽). exp { 𝑖𝑡};                                                                           (2.5) 
𝑖𝑡   = 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡;                                                                                              
 𝑉𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2);                                                                                           
𝑈𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2);                                                                                        
For i = 1,2,3...N;  t=1,2,3….T   
where, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 represents the log of  cost for the i
th state at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of  explanatory variables 
and 𝛽 is the associated vector of  technology parameters to be estimated. 𝑖𝑡 is a composite random 
error with probability density function 𝜆 =
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣⁄  and 𝜎
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣 
2.  𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the normally 
distributed random error. 𝑈𝑖𝑡 is the one sided, non-negative and half normally distributed disturbance 
term that captures inefficiency (Cornwell et al., 1990).  
I use translog functional form for the cost function in equation (2.5) (Atkinson & Cornwell, 
1994a,b; Filippini et al., 2004; See and Coelli, 2012; Hattori, 2002; Khanna et al., 1999) as defined in 
equation (2.1) to take advantage of its flexibility and to maintain consistency with estimation of 
elasticities of substitution18. Estimates of inefficiencies obtained from model (2.5) (stage one) are used 
in the post estimation analysis of inefficiencies according to equation (2.6) (stage two). Inefficiencies 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 are expressed in terms of contextual variables (𝑍), including elasticities of  substitution and state 
characteristics which are not included in the set of  production inputs in equation (2.5). The Z variables 
 
18Elasticities of substitution are estimated based on regressions for individual electric market regions with respective 
interactions between prices and state fixed effects to obtain state specific elasticities.  
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in the inefficiency model may also include input variables specified in the stochastic frontier model, 
provided the inefficiency effects are stochastic (Battese and Coelli, 1995).  
𝑈𝑖𝑡(𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝜹) =  𝛿1𝑍1𝑡  +  𝛿2𝑍2𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛿𝑛𝑍𝑛𝑡 +  𝑊𝑖𝑡;      𝑊𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝑁(0, 𝜔
2)  (2.6) 
Fixed effects estimation of the stochastic frontier model (2.5) may give inconsistent estimates 
because the classical stochastic frontier models that use panel data provide no mechanism to separate 
individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency (see Greene, 2005; Chen, 
Schmidt and Wang, 2014; Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). To this effect, Greene (2005) proposed a true fixed 
effect regression technique through maximum likelihood estimation (TFE-MLE), which accounts for 
unmeasured cross-sectional heterogeneity based on the probability density function of the error term 
( 𝑖𝑡). The TFE-MLE approach made it possible to measure inefficiency and heterogeneity across 
groups separately. However, the “Incidental parameters problem” in fixed effects specification of the 
stochastic frontier model can lead to inconsistency (Chen, Schmidt and Wang, 2014; Belotti and Ilardi, 
2017). Incidental parameters are “nuisance” parameters that increase as the number of groups in the 
panel cross-section becomes large. As a result, fixed effects estimation of SFA can be inefficient 
(Lancaster, 2000; Green 2005).  
Chen et al. (2014) provide an alternative approach to address this problem using within-
maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE) for the true fixed effects model by exploiting a within-group 
data transformation. Their maximum likelihood estimation is based only on the joint density of the 
deviations from means. WMLE approach removes the individual effects by employing the within 
group data transformation, where deviations from means of every variable in each group are used in 
the estimation. However, Chen et al. (2014) estimation assumes both, the random white noise and the 
inefficiency error components, to be homoscedastic. This assumption can affect inference in the SFA 
framework (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Belotti and Ilardi (2017) extended Chen et al. (2014) model 
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using first-order autoregressive process to allow for either homoscedastic or heteroskedastic 
inefficiency. They propose a marginalized maximum simulated likelihood estimation (MMSLE) based 
on the marginalization of the inefficiency term via simulation. In this approach, first difference 
estimation is used to eliminate nuisance parameters associated with fixed effects specification. The 
disadvantage with MMSLE is that model convergence is difficult to attain with high T-dimension 
(Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). In this study, I use TFE-MLE, WMLE, and MMSLE models for SFA. I 
estimate TFE-MLE and MMSLE using a one-step procedure (where 𝜷 and 𝜹  are estimated 
simultaneously combining steps one and two) following Caudill and Ford (1993) and Wang and 
Schmidt (2002). WMLE is implemented in a two-step procedure to estimate equations (2.5) and (2.6) 
respectively. 
 Although the relationship between elasticity of factor substitution and productivity has 
previously been addressed (Klump and de La Granville 2000), I am not aware of any studies which 
examine the relationship between technical inefficiencies and elasticities of substitution. Toward this 
end, I estimate a stochastic frontier distance function to assess the association between inter-fuel 
substitution and electricity generation inefficiency at the state scale. I am particularly interested in 
examining the changes in technical efficiency in recent years due to changes in the elasticities of 
substitution between coal and natural gas.  
 
2.2.3. Inter-Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions 
Next, I evaluate the relationship between interfuel substitution and CO2 emissions. I estimate 
a linear panel regression model (equation 2.7) with state (𝛼𝑖) and time (𝛾𝑡) fixed effects to test whether 
CO2 emissions respond to changes in elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                        (2.7) 
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where; Y is CO2 emissions, X is a vector of explanatory variables including elasticity of substitution 
and εit is the error term for state i and time t. Equation (2.7) estimates the impact of the variation in 
elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas, electricity production, renewable portfolio 
standards and the increase in the availability of natural gas on CO2 emissions in electricity generation. 
Point estimates of the state level elasticities of substitution are used as obtained from the systems of 
equations for each Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) electricity region.  
2.3 Data 
The dataset in this study consists of a panel of annual state-level observations from 2001 to 
2017, including prices and quantities of fossil fuels used for electricity generation, as well as total 
electricity generated from fossil fuels. The state-level consumption of coal, natural gas, and oil-based 
fuels for electricity generation is obtained from EIA (2019a) and is measured in million British thermal 
units (MMBTU) (Dahl and Ko, 1998). Oil-based fuels include petroleum liquids and petroleum coke 
aggregated into a single variable representing oil-based fuels measured in MMBTU. State-level total 
electricity production from coal, natural gas, and/or oil (MWH) across production types (electric 
generators, commercial and industrial combined heat and power facilities) is obtained from EIA’s 
state level data (EIA, 2019a). State-level prices for coal, natural gas, and oil in the electric power sector 
($/MMBTU) are obtained from EIA’s SEDS (State Energy Data System) database (EIA, 2019b). Cost 
shares are computed using state-level fuel prices, respective quantities used in electricity generation, 
and total expenditures on coal, natural gas, and oil in electricity generation at the state level. Seven 
states are excluded19 from the analysis because at least one of the three fuels is not used for electricity 
 
19 The following states are included in the study Alabama: (AL), Alaska (AK), Arizona (AZ), Arkansas (AR), Colorado 
(CO), Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), Kansas (KS), 
Kentucky (KY), Louisiana (LA), Maine (ME), Maryland (MD), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), 
Mississippi (MS), Missouri (MO), Montana (MT), Nebraska (NE), Nevada (NV), New Hampshire (NH), New Jersey (NJ), 
New Mexico (NM), New York (NY), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), Oklahoma (OK), Oregon (OR), Pennsylvania 
(PA), South Carolina (SC), South Dakota (SD), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), Virginia (VA), Washington (WA), West 
Virginia (WV), Wisconsin (WI) and Wyoming (WY). The following states are excluded: Hawaii (HI), Idaho (ID), Rhode 
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generation, and no prices are available for those fuels. I also include state level data on renewable 
portfolio standards obtained from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency 
(DSIRE) database (Prasad and Munch, 2012; Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 2017; Li and Yi, 2014). 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1. Variation in Fossil Fuel Mix in Electricity Generation 
I explore the mix of fossil fuels used in electricity generation using linear panel data models 
with state and time fixed effects. I focus on coal and natural gas because the use of petroleum oil in 
electricity generation is minor relative to coal and natural gas. Table 4 shows state and time fixed 
effects regression results for shares of coal and natural gas use in electricity generation relative to total 
fossil fuel use in terms of relative MMBTUs. Two models are used to examine the change in respective 
fuel shares over time. Both models include a binary Period variable (1 for 2009 and after, 0 
otherwise)20. The results confirm a significant drop (increase) in the share of coal in model A (natural 
gas in model B) after 2009, consistent with retirements and conversions of coal plants with limited 
replacement as observed in EIA data. The EIA data show that at the end of 2011 about 1,308 coal-
fired generating units with a capacity of 310 GW were operating in the United States. However, in 
2012 alone, 10.2 GW of coal-fired capacity was retired, representing about 3.2% of the 2011 total. 
Table 4 results indicate significant negative (positive) own (cross) price effect of natural gas.  
I also observe that the coefficient for electricity generation is negative and significant in model 
A. This implies that growth in electricity generation from fossil fuels (see also EIA, 2017) is associated 
with a significant drop in the share of coal relative to natural gas across states. The results in Table 4 
 
Island (RI), North Carolina (NC), Utah (UT), California (CA) and Vermont (VT). 
20 I use Zivot-Andrews (Zivot and Andrews, 2002) endogenous structural break test and the Chow test (Chow, 1960) for 
individual data series to identify the break-date (the largest Chow statistic) among all possible break dates (Quandt, 1960; 
Hansen, 2001). Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2 (in the Appendix) indicate 2009 as the most prevalent break date across the series. 
Natural gas price series have a structural break in 2009 in more than 30 states. 
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suggest that on average, across states coal intensity of electricity generation has declined due to the 
increased availability of low-priced natural gas. In addition to the direct substitution effect the impact 
of lower natural gas prices maybe also manifested through its moderating impact on electricity prices 
thereby reducing the economic viability of coal-based generators.  
Table 4: State and Time Fixed Effect Regression Results for Fossil Fuel Shares in Electricity 
Generation 
 A. Share Coal B. Share N. Gas 
Log Electricity Generation  -0.141 (0.05)***  0.117 (0.06)* 
Coal Price  0.004 (0.03)  0.024 (0.03) 
NG Price  0.018 (0.01)** -0.020 (0.01)** 
Period2 -0.209 (0.06)***  0.220 (0.06)*** 
RPS -0.015 (0.03)  0.033 (0.03) 
R-Squared  0.348  0.372 
Observations  Balanced panel n=43, T=17 and N=731 
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’ 
 
2.4.2. Fossil Fuel Substitution 
Tables 5 and 6 show average substitution elasticities (σCN) and corresponding price elasticities 
(own: εNN and εCC, and cross: εCN and εNC) for 2001-2008 and 2009-2017. Individual state elasticities 
are obtained from electricity market specific regressions (system 2.3), as defined by FERC (2019), for 
each of the two periods using state level data. The following electric power regions are considered: 
MISO (Midcontinent), ISO-NE (New England), NYISO (New York), Northwest, PJM 
(Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection), Southeast, Southwest, SPP (Southwest Power 
Pool) and ERCOT (Texas). I formally test whether the respective mean elasticities across states in 
each region changed significantly between two periods using pairwise tests. The results are provided 
in the last columns of Tables 5 and 6. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in mean 
elasticities across the two periods. The results show that substitutability between coal and natural gas 
increased post-2009 in MISO, Northwest, PJM, Southeast, SPP and NYISO. Three regions (ISO-NE, 
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Southwest and ERCOT) show statistically insignificant changes. Hence, an increased supply of natural 
gas enabled greater substitution between coal and natural gas on average in most regions and in most 
states21. Significant changes coincide with increased capacity of gas-fired generation and retiring or 
retrofitting coal-fired plants to meet emission standards (see FERC, 2012; Gao et al., 2013).  
 
Table 5: Fossil Fuel Substitution Elasticities 
 Pre-2009 Post-2009 Pairwise T-Test 
Electricity Regions Mean Mean P-value 
MISO  0.001(3.35)  0.92 (0.23)* 0.080* 
ISO-NE  0.55 (0.91)  0.93 (1.02) 0.33 
Northwest -0.76 (2.55)  0.73 (0.62) 0.05** 
PJM -0.04 (0.48)  0.29 (0.28) 0.06* 
Southeast  0.14 (0.29)  0.40 (0.31) 0.08* 
Southwest  0.26 (0.48)  0.33 (0.08) 0.44 
SPP -0.22 (0.23)  0.72 (1.36) 0.05** 
NYISO -9.33 (0.05)***  1.22 (0.18)** 0.00*** 
ERCOT  2.85 (0.10)***  0.83 (1.69) 0.10 
Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’ 
 
Heterogeneity of elasticities across states (as indicated by high relative standard deviations) in 
each region, illustrates the complexity of the interdependencies that can be disguised by regional and 
national elasticity estimates. The elasticities of substitution vary even among the states within the 
electricity markets (see Table 2.A1 in the Appendix). For example, the elasticities of substitution 
between coal and natural gas are statistically significant in CT pre and post-2009 and insignificant in 
other states in the ISO-NE region. In the PJM region, only VA had a significant elasticity of 
substitution between coal and natural gas in the pre-2009 period. In the Southwestern region, only 
AZ has significant elasticities of substitution in both periods. 
 
21 Table 2.A1 (in the Appendix) provides estimated substitution elasticities for states with statistically significant 




Table 6: Price Elasticities 
Estimates Pre 2009 Post 2009 Pairwise Test 
P-value Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 Own Price Elasticities      
 εCoal-Coal -0.228  0.235 -0.150  0.373 0.277 
 εN.Gas-N.Gas -0.289  0.461 -0.385  0.276 0.198 
 Cross Price Elasticities      
 εCoal-N.Gas  0.050 0.147  0.329  0.341 0.009*** 
 εN.Gas-Coal -0.117 1.164  0.283 0.198 0.014** 
Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’ 
 
On average own price elasticities for natural gas (coal) increased (decreased) across the two 
periods (Table 6). I estimated price elasticities at the state level and confirmed that own price elasticities 
for natural gas (εNN) and coal (εCC) have expected signs in both periods
22.  Own price elasticities are 
comparable to the estimates in prior literature.  Ko and Dahl (2001) use monthly US 1993 data to 
obtain national coal own price elasticity of -0.6 and natural gas own price elasticity of -1.5. Gao et al., 
(2013) use data from seven US electricity market regions from 2001 to 2008 and report own price 
elasticities for coal demand ranging between -1.76 and -0.07, and for natural gas ranging between -
0.75 to -0.19. I observe that changes in own price elasticities from before to after 2009 are 
heterogeneous across states even when states are located in the same electricity market (Table 2.A2 
and 2.A3 in the Appendix). For example, in the PJM region, statistically significant coal own price 
elasticities are observed in WV and VA but not in MD, OH and NJ. On average the results in Table 
6 indicate an increase in cross price elasticities in 2009-2017 relative to 2001-2008. The changes are 
again heterogeneous across regions and states (Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5 in Appendix).  
 
 
22 Tables 2.A2 to 2.A5 (in the Appendix) provide estimates of own price and cross price elasticities for states where 
estimates are statistically significant. 
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2.4.3. Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
The results from the Stochastic Frontier regressions are provided in Table 7.23 Probability 
density function (λ ) and variances of the disturbances (𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣) from the TFE-MLE model suggest 
that the variability in the frontier estimation is also emanating from technical inefficiency. Breusch-
Pagan and White statistic tests for heteroscedasticity of the inefficiency term across states fail to reject 
the constant variance assumption. In this respect, WMLE and MMSLE models are equally appropriate 
(Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). Translog cost function estimation in TFE-MLE and WMLE is based on 
state and time fixed effects. On the other hand, MMSLE failed to converge with time fixed effects in 
the pre-estimation as expected (Belotti and Ilardi, 2017). Therefore, in Table 7, I provide the results 
from only the TFE-MLE and WMLE models with state and time fixed effects in the cost function24. 
TFE-MLE results are preferred because they are based on a one-step estimation procedure (Wang 
and Schmidt, 2002). The results in Table 7 exclude time fixed effects in the second stage because I am 
interested in the average effect of the pre and post-2009 period on the inefficiencies25.   
The negative and significant coefficients for log of electricity generation (𝛿2) in Model B 
indicate that efficiency is gained when more electricity is generated as one would expect based on 
economies of scale. This result is consistent with prior finding pertaining to the economies of scale in 
the US electricity generation (Kwoka, 2005; Knittel, 2002). Cost ratio of coal and natural gas has a 
significant effect on inefficiency based in the TFE-MLE. Cost ratio impacts depend on the combined 
effects of changes in fuel quantities and prices. Since natural gas is more efficient than coal (Knittel, 
2002; Seifert et al., 2016; See and Coelli, 2012; EIA, 2012a), I expect inefficiency to drop with increase 
 
23 I only show results from the inefficiency model and skip coefficient estimates from the translog cost function because 
the interest at this point pertains to the determinants of inefficiency. Estimates from the translog SFA cost function are 
available upon request.   
24 The results from the MMSLE model without the time fixed effects are available upon request.  
25 The results from TFE-MLE and WMLE models with state and time fixed effects in both stages are available upon 
request. The conclusion from these results are similar to the results in Table 7 in terms of the effect of the elasticities of 
substitution and electricity generation on inefficiencies. 
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in the share of natural gas over coal. However, the cost ratio also depends on the relative prices of 
coal and natural gas. Increase in the relative price of coal leads to an increase in the use of natural gas. 
Hence, the combined effect of prices and quantities on the cost ratio is theoretically ambiguous.   
Table 7: Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results (TFE –MLE; Green 2005) 
 Variable description A. TFE –MLE; 
(Green 2005)  
B.  WMLE;  
(Chen et al., 2014)  
  Est (Std. Error) Est (Std. Error) 
LL Log Likelihood 191.650 a 
λ Lambda 2.525 (0.01)*** a 
𝜎𝑢 Sigma_u 0.298 (0.00)*** 
a 
𝜎𝑣 Sigma_v 0.118 (0.01)*** 
a 
 Inefficiency Parameters   
𝛿1 Per-capita energy consumption  0.063 (0.04) -0.034 (0.01)*** 
𝛿2 Log of electricity generation -0.041 (0.04) -0.073 (0.04)** 
𝛿3 Cost ratio (Coal/NG)  -3.306 (0.43)*** -0.1*10
-3 (0.0) 
𝛿4 Renewable Portfolio Standards -0.637 (0.26)**  0.019 (0.03) 
𝛿5 Net addition of generation capacity -0.1*10
-4(0.00) -0.1*10-4(0.0)* 
𝛿6 Elasticity of substitution, σC-NG -0.146 (0.05)*** -0.001 (0.00)* 
𝛿7 Time  0.062 (0.04)  0.004 (0.00) 
𝛿8 Period2 -0.106 (0.39) -0.024 (0.03) 
 Panel data    T=17, n=43;  N=731 
Standard errors in brackets; parameters not reported a; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5%’**’ 10% ‘*’ 
 
Statistically significant coefficients of the elasticity of substitution (𝛿6) indicate that an increase 
in the elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas improves technical efficiency. These 
results provide evidence of the positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution and technical 
efficiency. Previous studies have discussed the relevance of the elasticity of substitution for economic 
growth, technical change, and productivity (Hicks, 1932; de La Grandville, 1989; Klump and de La 
Grandville 2000). However, the role of elasticity of substitution for energy production efficiency has 
not been addressed. the results show a negative effect of the elasticity of substitution between coal 
and natural gas on technical inefficiency in fossil fuel based electricity generation.  
The results (Model A) also show that renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have a positive 
effect on technical efficiency. If natural gas based generation complements adoption of renewables, 
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then greater adoption of renewables and greater natural gas based generation may be expected to 
improve technical efficiency of fossil fuel based generation. Greater use of natural gas relative to coal 
would be expected to yield gains in technical efficiency of fossil fuels-based electricity generation 
(Knittel, 2002; Seifert et al., 2016; See and Coelli, 2012). On the other hand, if growth in renewable 
energy is not necessarily accompanied with an increase in natural gas based generation, then the effect 
of RPS and the associated increase in renewable generation on technical efficiency is theoretically 
ambiguous.  
Previous literature has documented a positive association between time and energy generation 
inefficiency using both aggregate (Fatima and Barik, 2012) and plant level data (See and Coelli, 2012; 
Seifert, Cullman and von Hirschhausen, 2016; Hattori, 2002; Khanna et al., 1999). Increase in 
inefficiency over time is generally attributed to deteriorating equipment. However, retirements of older 
power plants and installation of newer power plants are expected to improve technical efficiency. the 
results show that time (𝛿7) and period dummy (𝛿8) are statistically not significant. The data show that 
during 2001-2017 about 6.1GW were retired on average per year across all states, which is less than 
2.3% of total generation. 16.3GW on average was added each year. The decrease in inefficiency 
(though not statistically significant) in the 2009-2017 period is consistent with the overall increase in 
natural gas based electricity generation relative to coal based generation.  Natural gas-based generation, 
which is more efficient than coal-based generation (Knittel 2002, EIA 2012a) has been steadily 
increasing EIA (2012b).  
I also observe that inefficiency decreased in most states but increased in some states across 
the two periods. Overall, estimated inefficiency scores range from 0.09 to 0.46 with mean 0.19 and are 
comparable to estimates in previous literature. Chen et al., (2014) used a panel of US steam electric 
power generation data to estimate stochastic frontier production function. They found mean technical 
inefficiencies of 0.111 and 0.107 using WMLE and TFE-MLE, respectively. Rungsuriyawiboon and 
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Stefanou, (2007) used US utilities data from 1986 to 1999 for steam electric power generation and 
found inefficiency scores in the range of 0.212 to 0.265. Knittel, (2002) found mean technical 
inefficiency of 0.1757 using data from a large set of coal and natural gas generation units from 1981 
to 1996. 
2.4.4. Fossil Fuel Substitution and CO2 Emissions 
Technical efficiency in electricity generation has implications for CO2 emissions (Lee, & 
Zhang., (2012); Guo, Zhu, Fan, & Xie., (2011); Zhou, Ang, & Poh., (2008)). Having observed a 
negative relationship between technical inefficiency and elasticity of substitution I examine the 
relationship between inter-fuel substitution and carbon dioxide emissions using state and time fixed 
effects regression. Electricity producers minimize costs (equation (2.1)), in response to fuel prices with 
corresponding implications for technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. As a result, fossil fuel 
substitution induced by relative price changes of coal and natural gas can affect carbon emission. The 
standard panel regression model (equation (2.7)), with state and time fixed effects, is used to test 
whether CO2 emissions respond to changes in elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas. 
Results from the regression are reported in Table 8.  
The results in Table 8 show that the elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas has 
a significant and negative association with CO2 emissions. This result is consistent with Suh (2019) in 
terms of confirming the significance of interfuel substitution for CO2 emissions.  An increase in the 
state level elasticity of substitution between coal and natural gas leads to a decrease in CO2 emissions. 
In this respect, natural gas can be viewed as an important resource for reducing the carbon footprint 
of electricity generation relative to more coal-intensive generation when additional natural gas based 
generation increases substitution elasticity (see Sims, Rogner and Gregory, 2003). the results also 
indicate that with increased availability of natural gas post-2009, CO2 emissions decreased. These 
results are important for formulating or implementing energy and environmental policies because 
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inter-fuel substitution has implications for CO2 emissions.  
Table 8: State and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for CO2 Emissions 
Dep-log CO2 Emissions  Coef (Std. Error) 
Electricity production   0.512 (0.09)*** 
Elasticity of substitution -0.005 (0.00)* 
RPS -0.019 (0.03) 
Period2 -0.224 (0.03)*** 
Constant  11.96 (0.99)*** 
R-sq  0.75 
Observations  n=43, T=17 and N=731 




Heterogeneity of elasticities across major electricity production regions in the US has been 
documented in previous literature (Gao et al., 2013). This study shows that the differences in terms 
of elasticities of substitution, as well as technical inefficiencies, can be observed not only across major 
electricity regions but also across the states within those regions. The elasticities of substitution differ 
even across states that are located within the ten major electricity regions, as defined by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (Gao et al., 2013). Furthermore, I observe significant heterogeneity 
of technical inefficiency across states. Such heterogeneity may be present due to differences in 
resource endowments, technologies, institutional backgrounds, or state policies. The results show that 
elasticities of substitution have a statistically significant relation with technical efficiency and carbon 
emissions in electricity generation. I find that an increase in the elasticity of substitution between 
natural gas and coal has a positive relation with technical efficiency and a negative effect on CO2 
emissions. I also observe that state level elasticities of substitution and technical inefficiencies pre- and 
post- 2009 changed differently across states.  
The results imply that changes in generation technology mix can influence technical efficiency 
in part through associated changes in coal and natural gas substitution elasticity. These findings suggest 
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the need for careful analysis and planning for anticipated retirements of power generation units at 
regional scales. Over the past ten years most of the retired power plants have been fossil fuel based. 
Upcoming retirements through 2020 are also expected to be mostly coal plants and gas steam turbines 
(EIA, 2018). These changes will likely have spatially heterogeneous implications for natural gas and 
coal elasticities of substitution, technical efficiency of generation, and CO2 emissions. With greater 
elasticity of substitution, a decline in CO2 emissions can be expected. On the other hand, policies or 
changes in technology mix that may decrease elasticity of substitution can lead to increase in CO2 
emissions. Therefore, policies that may negatively affect elasticities of coal and natural gas substitution 
should consider associated increase in CO2 emissions. Policy implications for elasticity of substitution 
should also be considered at spatial disaggregated scales as the results document heterogeneous 
changes in elasticities of substitution in response to greater availability of natural gas. 
Electricity generation sector has adapted to the increased availability of economically 
recoverable natural gas reserves, and in April of 2015 for the first time, natural gas based electricity 
generation in the US surpassed coal powered electricity generation on a monthly basis (EIA, 2016). 
EIA forecasts also indicate that the share of gas-fired electricity generation will continue to rise but 
will fluctuate depending on relative fuel prices and infrastructure investments. State level fossil fuel 
substitution capabilities in electricity generation are limited due to technologic parameters of power 
plants, investment in new gas-fired power plants, and natural gas storage and shipping infrastructure. 
Although planned and existing pipeline infrastructure has been found to be adequate for anticipated 
needs of electric power sector (DOE, 2015), natural gas storage capacity can still limit the use of 
natural gas in electricity generation in some regions. Nevertheless, heterogeneity in fuel substitution 
across states, as documented in this study, highlights the need for understanding the implications of 
growing natural gas-based electricity generation and declining coal based generation for regional 
electric system operations including technical efficiency and CO2 emissions. It is important for policy 
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makers and the industry to understand the evolving fuel-substitution capabilities at the state levels to 
account for the electric power industry’s ability to respond to changes in the regulatory environment 
and relative fuel prices by adjusting fuel mix in electricity generation within and across utilities and 
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Table 2.A1. Elasticities of Substitution for Coal-Natural Gas (σCN) 
  2001-2008 2009-2017 Elasticity Change 
Region State σ1CN s.e(σ1CN) σ2CN s.e(σ2CN) σ2CN-σ1CN s.e(σ2CN-σ1CN) 
MISO AR  1.59 (0.31)***  0.71 (0.43) -0.88 (0.53) 
MISO IA  1.46 (0.63)*  0.51 (1.63) -0.95 (1.75) 
ISO-NE CT  1.36 (0.54)**  1.65 (0.46)***  0.29 (0.71) 
ISO-NE MA -0.03 (0.79)  1.8 (0.32)***  1.84 (0.85)* 
NYISO NY -9.33 (0.71)***  1.22 (0.42)**  10.56 (0.83)*** 
NorthWest NV -1.34 (0.48)**  1.41 (0.68)*  2.76 (0.83)** 
PJM VA -1.51 (0.62)** -0.56 (1.41)  0.95 (1.54) 
SouthEast AL  0.59 (0.10)***  0.69 (0.66)  0.10 (0.67) 
SouthEast GA  0.58 (0.23)**  0.90 (1.23)  0.31 (1.25) 
SouthWest AZ -0.43 (0.14)**  0.49 (0.11)***  0.92 (0.18)*** 
SouthWest NM  0.95 (0.30)**  0.50 (0.24)* -0.46 (0.39) 
ERCOT TX  2.85 (0.31)***  0.83 (1.460 -2.02 (1.50) 




Table 2.A2. Own Price Elasticities for Coal (εCC) 
  2001-2008 2009-2017 Elasticity Change 
Region State ε1CC s.e(ε1CC) ε2CC s.e(ε2CC) ε2CC-ε1CC s.e(ε2CC-ε1CC) 
MISO AR -0.50 (0.12)*** -0.41 (0.24)  0.09 (0.27) 
MISO MS -0.83 (0.24)** -0.78 (0.47)  0.05 (0.53) 
MISO ND -0.25 (0.18)  0.88 (0.50)  1.13 (0.53)** 
ISO-NE MA -0.37 (0.66) -0.58 (0.23)** -0.21 (0.70) 
NYISO NY -0.48 (0.13)*** -0.20 (0.28)  0.28 (0.31) 
NorthWest NV  0.02 (0.25) -1.90 (0.55)** -1.92 (0.60)** 
NorthWest WA  0.15 (0.14) -0.59 (0.30)* -0.74 (0.33)** 
PJM VA -0.84 (0.25)** -0.61 (0.42)  0.23 (0.49) 
PJM WV -0.43 (0.18)**  0.12 (0.24)  0.55 (0.30) 
SouthEast AL -0.19 (0.05)*** -0.35 (0.39) -0.16 (0.39) 
SouthWest AZ -0.19 (0.14) -0.55 (0.05)*** -0.36 (0.15)** 
SouthWest CO  0.01 (0.14) -0.17 (0.08)* -0.18 (0.16) 
SouthWest NM -0.62 (0.42) -0.33 (0.15)*  0.29 (0.45) 
SPP SD -0.75 (0.21)***  0.21 (1.17)  0.96 (1.19) 
ERCOT TX -0.13 (0.02)*** -0.31 (0.28) -0.18 (0.28) 








Table 2.A3. Own Price Elasticities for Natural-Gas (εNN) 
  2001-2008 2009-2017    Elasticity Change 
Region State ε1NN s.e(ε1NN) ε2NN s.e(ε2NN) ε2NN - ε1NN s.e(ε2NN - ε1NN) 
MISO AR -1.15 (0.19)*** -0.43 (0.25) 0.73 (0.31)* 
ISO-NE CT -0.51 (0.15)** -0.29 (0.04)*** 0.22 (0.16) 
ISO-NE MA -0.29 (0.30) -0.60 (0.09)*** -0.32 (0.32) 
ISO-NE ME -0.26 (0.23) -0.51 (0.08)*** -0.25 (0.24) 
NYISO NY -2.85 (0.42)*** -0.69 (0.12)*** 2.15 (0.44)*** 
NorthWest NV -0.14 (0.31) -0.73 (0.17)*** -0.59 (0.35) 
PJM DE -0.49 (0.16)** -0.11 (0.28) 0.38 (0.33) 
SouthEast AL -0.38 (0.06)*** -0.35 (0.33) 0.04 (0.33) 
SouthEast FL -0.43 (0.11)*** -0.11 (0.47) 0.33 (0.48) 
SouthEast GA -0.48 (0.18)** -0.54 (0.73) -0.06 (0.75) 
SouthWest AZ -0.10 (0.03)** -0.25 (0.05)*** -0.15 (0.06)** 
SouthWest CO -0.13 (0.06)* -0.02 (0.14) 0.11 (0.15) 
SouthWest NM -0.18 (0.04)*** -0.16 (0.08)* 0.02 (0.09) 
ERCOT TX -2.28 (0.16)*** -0.73 (1.10) 1.55 (1.11) 
Standard errors in brackets; Significance levels: 1% ‘***’ 5% ‘**’ 10% ‘*’ 
 
Table 2.A4. Cross Price Elasticities for Coal-Natural Gas (εCN) 
  2001-2008 2009-2017 Elasticity Change 
Region State ε1CN s.e(ε1CN) ε2CN s.e(ε2CN) ε2CN- ε1CN s.e(ε2CN- ε1CN) 
MISO AR  0.70 (0.14)***  0.30 (0.18) -0.40 (0.23) 
MISO IA  0.37 (0.16)**  0.09 (0.29) -0.28 (0.33) 
ISO-NE CT  0.85 (0.34)**  1.43 (0.40)***  0.58 (0.53) 
ISO-NE MA -0.02 (0.42)  1.32 (0.23)***  1.33 (0.48)** 
NYISO NY -1.31 (0.10)***  0.81 (0.28)**  2.12 (0.30)*** 
NorthWest NV -0.57 (0.20)**  0.89 (0.43)*  1.46 (0.47)** 
PJM VA -0.46 (0.19)** -0.21 (0.53)  0.25 (0.56) 
SouthEast AL  0.21 (0.04)***  0.35 (0.33)  0.14 (0.34) 
SouthEast GA  0.12 (0.05)**  0.37 (0.51)  0.26 (0.52) 
SouthWest AZ -0.29 (0.09)**  0.26 (0.06)***  0.55 (0.11)*** 
SouthWest NM  0.75 (0.24)**  0.34 (0.16)* -0.42 (0.29) 
ERCOT TX  0.18 (0.02)***  0.15 (0.27) -0.03 (0.27) 











Table 2.A5. Cross Price Elasticities for Natural Gas-Coal (εNC) 
  2001-2008 2009-2017 Elasticity Change 
Region State ε1NC s.e(ε1NC) ε2NC s.e(ε2NC) ε2NC- ε1NC s.e(ε2NC- ε1NC) 
MISO AR  0.84 (0.16)***  0.41 (0.25) -0.43 (0.30) 
MISO IA  1.05 (0.45)*  0.41 (1.30) -0.64 (1.38) 
ISO-NE CT  0.22 (0.09)**  0.11 (0.03)*** -0.12 (0.09) 
ISO-NE MA -0.01 (0.17)  0.35 (0.06)***  0.36 (0.18)* 
NYISO NY -2.93 (0.22)***  0.22 (0.08)**  3.15 (0.24)*** 
North-West NV -0.73 (0.26)**  0.51 (0.24)*  1.24 (0.36)** 
PJM VA -0.82 (0.34)** -0.30 (0.75)  0.53 (0.82) 
South-East AL  0.37 (0.06)***  0.34 (0.32) -0.04 (0.33) 
South-East GA  0.46 (0.18)**  0.52 (0.71)  0.06 (0.73) 
South-West AZ -0.14 (0.05)**  0.22 (0.05)***  0.36 (0.07)*** 
South-West NM  0.20 (0.06)**  0.16 (0.08)* -0.04 (0.10) 
ERCOT TX  2.59 (0.28)***  0.68 (1.18) -1.92 (1.22) 















































Zivot-Andrews Structural Breaks in State Data Series
Electricity production Coal Prices N.Gas Prices
Oil Prices Cost of Production Coal Cost Share









































Chow Structural Breaks in State Data Series
Electricity Production Coal Price N. Gas price
Oil Price Coal Cost Share Gas Cost Share
Oil Cost Share Cost of Production
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CHAPTER 3.    All the DUCs in a Row: Natural Gas Production in the US. 
 
Abstract 
Using data from seven shale gas regions in the United States, I examine 
natural gas production in terms of drilling rig activity and well completion 
rates. the objectives are to examine the role and determinants of well 
completion decisions in the US natural gas production. I observe that in recent 
years, the explanatory power of drilling rig count has declined. On the other 
hand, the number of producing wells remain a significant factor in explaining 
the variation in gas production. I find that an increase in the number of drilled 
but uncompleted wells (DUCs) has a significant role in natural gas supply. The 
number of DUCs depends on drilling rig activity and futures prices of oil and 
natural gas. Also, the results indicate that well completion decisions and the 
duration of DUC status depend on oil and gas prices, pipeline capacity, 



















Understanding the determinants of natural gas supply is important because of its significance 
for the US power sector (Peters and Hertel, 2017; Stephens, 2018) and US economic activity in general 
(Arora and Lieskovsky, 2014; Melick, 2014; Weber, 2012; Joskow, 2013)26. Previous academic literature 
relied on drilling rig activity (measured in terms of the count of actively drilling rigs) as the primary 
determinant of oil and gas production because of the simplicity, availability, and global applicability of 
drilling rig count as an indicator (Apergis, Ewing and Payne, 2016; Melek, 2015). The oil and gas 
industry also has been relying on rig count as a measure of oil and gas production activity27. However, 
as Figure 7 illustrates, natural gas production in the US increased even though drilling activity, 
measured in terms of the number of actively drilling rigs, has declined in recent years (EIA, 2019a).  
Along with the growth in the use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies, 
market analysts, researchers and government agencies have noted the increase in the inventory of 
drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs) in the US (Hegarty, 2017; EIA 2013; EIA 2019b; Dunning, 
2016; Srinivasan, Krishnamurthy and Kaufman, 2019; IHS, 2016; Piotrowski, 2016). However, little 
or no systematic information is available on the growth of DUC inventory and the implications for 
natural gas production. This paper examines the determinants of DUC inventories and the impacts of 
drilling rig activity and well completion on natural gas output in the US. 
Technological developments in unconventional oil and gas (UOG) production have 
transformed the US gas industry. According to the US EIA, domestic production of gas from the 
UOG industry grew by more than 100 % from 2000 to 2010. Data from the EIA (2016a) also indicate 
that daily production of US dry shale increased from 2.5 in 2002 to 43 billion cubic feet in 2016, with 
 
26Large number of studies also document the relationship between energy in general and economic growth (See Hamilton, 2013).  
27For example, Baker Hughes has been reporting rig count since 1944 (Baker Hughes, 2019).   
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most of the new production coming from the Northern Appalachian basin (Marcellus and Utica shale 
units). Substantial gains in productivity continue through advances such as super pads (which can 
include up to 20 wells), extended horizontal laterals (reaching up to 20 thousand feet28) and improved 
drilling and fracturing technologies. The share of horizontally drilled wells increased from 3% in 2008 
to 12% in 2017 (EIA 2018). As a result, although the number of drilling rigs fell since 2014, natural 
gas production has continued to grow (Figure 7) (EIA, 2019a).  
 
Figure 7: US rig activity and natural gas production 
In general, UOG production involves two stages. The first stage involves drilling, casing the 
well with multiple strings of steel pipe, and cementing the pipe. In the second stage (completion), the 
steel casing is perforated, and the well is stimulated via hydraulic fracturing to initiate gas flow from 
fractured formations. Completion, which can be significantly more expensive and time consuming 
than the first stage activities, can be delayed indefinitely. However, interrupting the flow from a 
producing well can be prohibitively costly in terms of foregone income (Kleinberg et al., 2018). Hence, 
production timing decisions take the form of drilling and completion decisions corresponding to 
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stages one and two, respectively (Mason and Roberts, 2018). Wells drilled (stage one), but not 
hydraulically fractured or completed are labeled as drilled but uncompleted wells (DUCs). 
Figure 8 shows that the aggregate number of DUCs has increased since 2007 across all regions. 
From November 2016 to the end of 2017, the number of DUCs rose 37.4% to 7,493 (DI, 2016). 
EIA’s (2019a) drilling productivity report shows more than 8,700 DUCs as of November 2018. 
Growth in DUCs varies by region, with the largest increase observed in the Permian Basin. The 
reasons for the delays in well completion, and consequent growth in the DUC numbers, may include: 
shortage of hydraulic fracturing equipment and teams, contractual lease obligations that require active 
well development in stage one, pipeline capacity bottlenecks, and operators’ timing decisions to take 
advantage of favorable prices (EIA, 2019b; Kleinberg et al., 2018).   
One implication of the increase in DUCs is that aggregate natural gas production depends less 
on drilling rig activity and more on well completion rates. As a result of growth in unconventional 
production, and associated two-stage production technology use, drilling rig counts no longer directly 
correspond to the number of producing wells. Hence, the number of completed wells may be 
increasingly important for modeling natural gas production. Though the drilling rig count remains an 
important factor in natural gas production, increase in production is achieved with fewer drilling rigs 




Figure 8. Rig count, drilled and un-completed well count, and natural gas production trends from 2007-2018  
Importantly, for overall production to grow, the productivity of new wells must offset declines in 
productivity of legacy wells (Boyce and Nøstbakken, 2011). Therefore, this paper considers both the 
number of producing wells and the number of newly completed wells as drivers of natural gas output. 
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, I examine the role of well completion rates in 












































































































































































































































































































































































Jan-2006 Jan-2008 Jan-2010 Jan-2012 Jan-2014 Jan-2016 Jan-2018
Permian
Natural Gas Production (mmcf/d)
Rig Count




represent the gap between drilled and completed wells. Third, I identify the factors that influence the 
length of time that operators take to complete unconventional wells. 
The literature on the determinants of natural gas production is limited. Iledare (1995) uses a 
supply model for natural gas reserve additions in West Virginia to study the responsiveness of drilling 
effort and gross reserve additions to changes in the expected wellhead price, taxes, resource depletion 
and reserve life index. He concludes that drilling activity shifts across geological formations in 
response to varying geologic conditions and economic incentives. Boyce and Nøstbakken (2011) show 
a positive correlation between output prices and drilled wells, enabled by a significant decrease in the 
cost of drilling. Chen and Linn (2017) examine the effects of oil and gas futures prices on drilling 
activity in the US and the rest of the world. They show that drilling activities respond to futures prices 
more than spot prices. This is consistent with the industry practice of hedging gas production. Gülen 
et al., (2013) also document the sensitivity of drilling new wells to changes in natural gas prices. Similar 
results with a positive association between oil rig activity and crude oil prices have been documented 
by Ringlund, Rosendahl and Skjerpen (2008), Apergis et al. (2016), Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant 
(2018) and Khalifa, Caporin and Hammoudeh (2017).   
Mason and Roberts (2018) examine the sensitivity of well level natural gas production in 
Wyoming to geologic and economic factors. They show that geologic factors affect intra-well 
production variation (well productivity) while prices affect inter-well production changes (number of 
producing wells) via producer drilling decisions. They conclude that after a well has started producing, 
prices have limited effect on well-level production. Instead, geologic and engineering factors 
determine well productivity. However, prices have a significant effect on total supply due to the 
elasticity of producers’ drilling decisions. The authors show that at lower prices, only the most 
productive wells are drilled, while higher prices enable drilling of less productive wells. They also 
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observe that the elasticity of drilling decisions in Wyoming increased since the use of horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing technologies. Ikonnikova and Gulen (2015) also examine the effect of prices 
on drilling activities in Barnett, Haynesville, and Fayetteville shale units. They show that at lower 
prices, producers in some locations may find it more profitable to rely on low-cost infill29 wells to 
minimize capital costs as opposed to drilling relatively more productive but costlier wells in new 
locations.  
None of the previous studies examine growth in DUC numbers and the relationships between 
gas production, drilling rig activity and well completion across shale regions in the US. I disentangle 
these variables, which allows us to present a more nuanced account of production activities given the 
recent growth in the number of drilled but uncompleted wells. the results document greater 
explanatory power of the number of producing wells relative to the count of active rigs for modeling 
natural gas production30. I also show that changes in oil and gas futures prices and drilling rig activity 
affect DUC numbers and the length of time that operators take to complete individual drilled wells.  
3.2 Data 
Unconventional shale gas production makes up more than 50% of all-natural gas produced in 
the US and its contribution continues to increase with most of the production coming from seven 
major shale regions (EIA, 2017). This study is based on the data from Anadarko, Appalachia 
(Marcellus and Utica), Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Niobrara and Permian regions.  
 
29Infill wells are drilled and completed next to existing wells as opposed to new locations. Infill wells are less productive 
but require lower upfront capital costs by taking advantage of existing infrastructure and existing lease arrangements. 
30Although the principles addressed in this study are applicable to both oil and gas production, I focus the analysis on 
unconventional gas production and reserve the analysis of oil production to future studies. I acknowledge that in some 
cases oil and gas production is joint. For example, unconventional production in the Permian basin is primarily aimed at 
oil with associated gas production.  
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I use monthly regional data from January 2007 to July 2018 to examine cumulative natural gas 
production and DUC counts, and daily well level data from 2000 to 2018 to estimate hazard ratios31. 
The data summary is presented in Table 9. Rig count and natural gas production32 (million cubic feet 
- mmcf) data are obtained from the EIA. Well completion data obtained from DrillingInfo (now 
Enverus) include a monthly cumulative number of producing wells. Rig count data (disregarding the 
differences in rig requirements across regions due to geological characteristics) are provided by Baker 
Hughes.  
Rig activity in this study reflects only the number of actively33 drilling rigs. Figure 8 presents 
data trends for drilling rig counts, DUCs, and gas production. Since 2007, natural gas production has 
been increasing significantly in most regions, except in Niobrara and Haynesville. Substantial increase 
in production can be attributed to significant gains in productivity enabled by recent technological 
improvements. Haynesville lies deeper than the shale reservoirs in other regions making supply 
sensitive to price variation. Drilling rig activity in this region went down significantly and in 2016 
drilling rig count dropped to 20 rigs. 
To examine the growth in the number of DUCs, I use estimated monthly count of DUCs 
from January 2007 to July 201834. Figure 8 shows that the numbers of DUCs have been increasing 
 
31Natural gas production and DUC count analysis covers 2007 to 2018 because EIA data on monthly rig count and 
production per region are available only starting from January 2007. I used an expanded sample time frame in the survival 
analysis from January 2000 to July 2018 based on DUC duration data availability. 
32EIA estimates natural gas production using data reported by various industry sources. In this study, I use up to date 
natural gas production numbers as reported by the EIA. 
33The rig is active if it is drilling at least 15 days during the month. This measure excludes rigs involved in non-drilling 
activities like workovers and production testing. This definition is consistent with EIA (2019a) and Baker Hughes (2019).  
34Estimates of DUC numbers can vary depending on methodologies, assumptions, and availability of data. EIA counts a 
drilled well to be uncompleted after 20 days’ post spudding (EIA, 2016b). EIA started providing DUC count as of 
December 2013. To increase the sample size, I estimate DUCs using DrillingInfo well level data from January 2000 to July 
2018 following the EIA methodology. Comparison of EIA DUC data and the estimated DUC numbers after 2013 reveals 
insignificant mean difference at 5% significance level in most regions except Appalachia and Permian. In these regions, 
the difference is insignificant at 1% level.  The comparisons are available upon request. The minor difference in some 
regions can be due to the estimation method. the computations account for DUCs drilled since 2000. On the other hand, 
EIA excludes wells drilled prior to December 2013. 
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since 2007, with greater increases observed in Permian, Niobrara, and Anadarko regions. However, in 
Appalachia and Eagle Ford regions, the numbers of DUCs have decreased since 2014. The declines 
in the numbers of DUCs in Appalachia and Eagle Ford imply that completion of previously drilled 
but uncompleted wells has been outpacing drilling of new wells.  
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics  
Region Variable  N. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
All Regions N.Gas Future Price ($/mcf)** 6,787 4.91 2.29 1.35 14.74 
  Oil Future Price ($/b)** 6,787 62.41 27.20 14.06 145.90 
Anadarko Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 16.3 2.7 13.3 19.3 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 5.1 0.8  3.9 7.0 
  Rig Count/month* 139 155 55 55 247 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 1.1 0.4 0.4 1.7 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 16.2 2.7 9.8 19.7 
 DUC Duration35 (Days)** 14,840 88 121 1 1,778 
 UOG Well Measured Depth36 
(103Ft)** 
14,781 13.4 3.8 0.1 38.9 
Appalachia Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 40.1 11.1 29.7 59.8 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 11.2 9.1 1.3 28.7 
  Rig Count/month* 139 90 33 36 154 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 1.1 0.7 0.01 2.0 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 47.6 7.2 20.5 54.9 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 14,649 317 249 1 1821 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
14,529 12.6 3.8 0.04 40.0 
Bakken Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 7.7 0.4 7.2 8.1 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 0.9 0.7 0.2 2.4 
  Rig Count/month* 139 105 64 24 218 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 0.9 0.5 0.2 1.7 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 6.2 4.7 0.5 13.2 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 15,738 142 153 1 1656 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
15,705 18.8 3.4 1.9 27.2 
 
35 DUC duration variable measures length of time in days from end of drilling (spud date plus 20 days) to well completion 
or to first production for only completed unconventional wells. Minimum DUC duration of 1 day indicates that every 
region has at least 1 well which was completed in 21 days after spudding. Maximum DUC duration reflects maximum 
duration before the DUC well is treated as “dead”. For the purpose of this study, outlier wells (wells drilled and not 
completed within the period of 5 years) are treated as “dead” DUCs and they constitute about 0.3% of the data.  




Eagle Ford Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 5.5 1.5 3.7 7.8 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 4.2 2.2 1.5 7.4 
  Rig Count/month* 139 134 87 30 279 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 1.3 0.6 0.3 2.4 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 7.4 2.9 3.0 11.6 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 25,230 149 204 1 1,821 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
25,225 14.9 3.2 0.4 39.4 
Haynesville Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 38.4 6.0 30.4 46.8 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 6.7 1.9 3.6 10.6 
  Rig Count/month* 139 104 73 16 244 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.0 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 15.7 3.0 8.1 18.7 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 7,965 116 137 1 1,728 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
7,949 14.9 3.6 1.1 39.9 
Niobrara Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 21.2 6.4 10.6 27.3 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 4.5 0.3 3.4 5.1 
  Rig Count/month* 139 72 30 16 127 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.9 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 2.5 0.7 1.2 3.3 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 11,872 133 150 1 1,821 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
11,373 11.5 3.6 0.4 40.0 
Permian Pipeline Capacity (103 mmcfd)** 139 16.6 2.5 13.3 20.2 
  N.Gas Production (103 
mmcf)/month* 
139 5.7 1.7 3.8 1.0 
  Rig Count/month* 139 335 132 92 565 
  DUC Well Count 103/month* 139 2.5 0.8 0.4 4.3 
  Producing Well Count 103/month* 139 109.3 21.8 30.4 136.9 
 DUC Duration (Days)** 36,513 132 182 1 1,822 
 UOG Well Measured Depth 
(103Ft)** 
36,486 13.1 4.1 0.4 40.0 
Note: **Data is from 2000- 2018 and *data is from 2007-2018.  
To explain the variation across regions and over time, I control for pipeline capacity, drilling 
rig count, and futures prices of natural gas (measured in dollars per thousand cubic feet) and oil 
(measured in dollars per barrel). Following Chen and Linn (2017), I compute average futures prices 
of natural gas and oil using all available, 𝑚, futures contracts from the trading floor of the New York 
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Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). I define futures price (𝐹𝑡) at time t as a function of the contract 





𝑚=1 , where 𝐶𝑡,𝑚 denotes the price of the m-th contract at time t. 
Contract prices and natural gas pipeline capacity data are obtained from the EIA. Pipeline capacity 
measures outflow volume of pipeline infrastructure expressed in million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d). 
Table 9 indicates that pipeline capacity increased the most in the Appalachian region with more than 
30,000 mmcf added between 2007 to 2018. On the other hand, Bakken experienced the least 
expansion in pipeline capacity with less than 1000mmcf added over the same period. In Eagle Ford, 
Niobrara, Haynesville, Anadarko and Permian capacities increased by 4,141mmcf, 16,708mmcf, 
16,386mmcf, 5,968mmcf and 6,920mmcf respectively.  
In the time-to-event (survival) analysis of DUC duration status, I use individual well level data 
from January 2000 to July 2018. DUC duration status for an individual unconventional well is the 
number of days between the end of stage one37 and completion or beginning of gas production. 
Completion date in the analysis is the earliest of the reported well completion date or the date of first 
reported production38. Summary statistics of DUC duration are presented in Table 9.  
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
The empirical strategy includes: a) the analysis of natural gas production in terms of drilling 
rig counts and producing wells using linear fixed effects and vector autoregressive models, b) the 
analysis of DUC counts within and across regions using linear fixed effects regressions, and c) the 
analysis of individual DUC duration status using survival analysis technique.     
 
37Following EIA methodology, I assume that stage one takes 20 days on average.  
38Many wells are completed/fractured more than once, and the data do not indicate whether a specific completion date corresponds to first 
completion or a recompletion. Therefore, I use the earlier of the first production or completion dates to avoid re-completion entries. 
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3.3.1. Natural gas production 
I first use a linear regression model in double log form to explore the effect of (lagged) rig 
count (RC) and producing wells (PW) on natural gas production (NGP) individually and in 
combination. Next, I estimate autoregressive models as a robustness check. I test for unit roots using 
Phillips-Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988), Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and 
panel Levin-Lin-Chu (Levin, et al., 2002) statistics. Subsequently, I conduct a panel cointegration 
analysis to determine the long-run relationship between natural gas production, rig count, and the 
number of producing wells39. The Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel cointegration test is used to test for 
the group and bivariate cointegration relationships. I compute four panel and three group statistics 
following Neal (2014) based on the ‘within’ and the ‘between’ dimensions respectively (Pedroni 1999, 
2004). I also test for cointegration within each region using the Johansen test (Johansen, 1988, 1995a, 
b). I proceed with estimating a panel VAR with generalized methods of moments (Abrigo and Love, 
2016). Next, I estimate each region’s VEC (vector error correction) model to account for cointegration 
within regions (Engle and Granger, 1987). The VEC model is specified as follows:  
𝛥𝑌𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛿𝜂𝑘𝑡−1 + ∑  𝛽𝑘𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑌𝑘𝑡−𝑖 +  
+ ∑ 𝛷1𝑘𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑋1𝑘𝑡−𝑖+. . + ∑ 𝛷𝑗𝑘𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑘𝑡    (3.1) 
where Δ is the first difference operator; 𝒀𝒌𝒕 is natural gas production in log form in each region k at 
period t; 𝑿𝒋 is the j-th explanatory variable in log form; 𝜼 are the residuals from the cointegration 
vector; p is the optimal lag length; 𝜶𝒌 is the intercept, and 𝜺𝒕 is the error term.  
 
39 Following Liew (2004), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) (Hannan and Quinn 1979) is used to determine the appropriate lag length for each 
series in each region. 
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3.3.2. DUC Counts 
To examine the growth in the number of DUCs, I use regional fixed effects regression models 
in log-log form with and without time fixed effects40, with first differences, and standardized variables. 
The independent variables include pipeline capacity, drilling rig count, natural gas and oil futures 
prices. Futures prices (FP) rather than spot prices are used following Chen and Linn (2017) who 
showed that futures prices have a more significant effect on natural gas production than spot prices. 
The futures prices (FP) are lagged to account for the time that it takes the operators to initiate 
production in response to price movements (Osmundsen et al., 2015). I use standardized variables 
obtained by subtracting the mean (across regions and within regions) and pipeline capacity expressed 
in first difference to estimate the fixed effects regression model41. Standardization approach reduces 
the scale of variables but preserves the interpretation of the regression coefficients to represent the 
mean change in the DUC given a unit change in the independent variable.  
3.3.3. DUC Status Duration 
In this analysis, I am interested in examining the factors that influence the length of time that 
operators take to complete the drilled wells. Time to event (duration/survival) analysis (see Sy and 
Taylor, 2000; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Fleming and Harrington 2011; Hernandez and 
Dresdner, 2010) is used to analyze DUC duration data. I define a random variable T with a continuous 
probability distribution function 𝑓(𝑡) to represent DUC duration, or the number of days from the 
end of drilling to completion. The probability that a drilled well is completed in t days is given by 
𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇 < 𝑡). Correspondingly, the survival function, or the probability of a drilled well not 
being completed in t days, is 𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡). The hazard rate (𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡)/𝑆(𝑡)), is the probability 
that a drilled well will be completed at time, t, given that it was not completed prior to t.  I use semi-
 
40Hausman test (Chi2(5) =78.04; Prob>Chi2=0.00) indicted superiority of Fixed Effects regression over a Random Effects model. Joint F test results 
(F (135, 820) =1.92 Prob>F=0.00) suggest including time fixed effects. 
41After standardization all VIFs were less than 5 with mean of 2.81 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1995).  
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parametric42 Cox proportional hazard model (equation (3.2)) (Cox, 1972) to represent the hazard 
function in the DUC duration analysis (Stogiannis et al. 2011).   
𝜆(𝑡|𝑥, 𝜷) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿
′β)        (3.2) 
where  𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters of 𝑋 covariates, 𝜆0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function 
when 𝜆(𝑡|𝑥 = 0) = 𝜆0(𝑡) and can take any form as a function of t. The effects of covariates can be 
represented in various specifications of the hazard function. 
 
3.4 Results 
I start with examining the difference in the relationship between natural gas production and 
rig count (RC) before and after February 200943. In addition to the expansion in unconventional gas 
production, this breakpoint is also close to the economic downturn and to the beginning of the new 
US administration. Each of these factors could have contributed to the structural break timing.  
Nevertheless, I believe that the breakpoint adequately reflects the changes in natural gas production 
series and enables meaningful comparison of production pre and post 2009.  
Table 10: Split Sample Regional Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP 
Dependent – NGP Before Feb 2009 After Feb 2009 
Rig Countt-1 0.212 (0.04)*** -0.048 (0.03) 
Constant 13.55 (0.17)*** 15.54 (0.15)*** 
R-sq 0.17 0.010 
Observations n=7, T=25, N=175 n=7, T=113, N=791 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard Errors in Brackets 
 
42I also estimate parametric specifications including exponential, Weibull and Gompertz functions. These results are available on request. 
43I test for the presence of a structural break using Wald-type tests (Vogelsang, 1997; Andrews 1993; Andrews and Ploberger 1994) in the linear 
regression of natural gas production (NGP) and rig count (RC). I estimate a linear regression model and compute the S-wald test statistic for an 
unknown break. I also used this method to identify the breaks (Bi) for each region independently.  The results show May 2010 for Anadarko, August 




The results from regional fixed effects regression models with lagged RC are presented in 
Table 10. These results show a significant change in the explanatory power of lagged RC for natural 
gas production (NGP). The rig count is positively correlated with natural gas production prior to 
February 2009. However, after February 2009 RC has a statistically insignificant relationship with 
natural gas production and a weaker explanatory power. A similar loss of explanatory power of RC is 
found with heterogeneous break point dates across regions (see Table 3.A1 in the Appendix). 
3.4.1. Determinants of Natural Gas Production (NGP) 
Table 11 shows regression results with region fixed effects and logged NGP as the dependent 
variable. Three model results are presented. R-squared values show that Models 2 and 3, which include 
producing wells (PW) explain more of the variation in NGP than Model 1 (with only RC).  The 
marginal contribution of producing wells as an explanatory variable relative to the rig count is 
significant, as revealed by the difference in R-squared values between Models 1 and 2. Comparison of 
Models 2 and 3 illustrates that although rig count is statistically significant and remains to be a 
meaningful determinant of NGP, its marginal contribution to explaining variation in natural gas 
production is smaller relative to the number of producing wells. These results are robust under 
heterogeneous break period specification across producing regions (see Appendix Table 3.A2). 
Table 11: Region and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results for Aggregate NGP 
NGP-Dep Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Rig Countt-1  0.332 (0.03)***   0.274 (0.03)*** 
Producing Wells  0.524 (0.04)***  0.468 (0.03)*** 
Feb 2009   1.413 (0.22)*** 1.044 (0.22)***  1.093 (0.21)*** 
Constant  12.94 (0.22)*** 9.906 (0.41)***  9.132 (0.41)*** 
R-sq  0.58 0.61  0.64 
Observations             Balanced Panel n=7, T=138, N=966 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018 
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To explore the relationship at the regional scale, I estimate Models 1, 2 and 3 for each region 
individually. The results presented in Table 12 are consistent with the results in Table 11, with all but 
two of the regions showing statistically significant effects of producing wells (PW).  
Table 12: Regional Regression Results (Determinants of NGP) 
Region Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Anadarko    
Rig Countt-1 -0.003 (0.03)   0.002 (0.02) 
Producing Wells   0.894 (0.07)***  0.908 (0.07)*** 
Feb 2009  0.202 (0.03)*** -0.126 (0.03)*** -0.126 (0.03)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.230  0.633  0.630 
Appalachia    
Rig Countt-1 -0.663 (0.19)***   -0.521 (0.16)*** 
Producing Wells   3.978 (0.50)***  3.874 (0.49)*** 
Feb 2009  2.222 (0.20)***  0.596 (0.22)***  0.915 (0.24)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.482  0.621  0.642 
Bakken    
Rig Countt-1 -0.264 (0.09)***  -0.083 (0.03)** 
Producing Wells   0.896 (0.03)***  0.884 (0.03)*** 
Feb 2009  1.571 (0.15)*** -0.318 (0.08)*** -0.245 (0.09)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.436  0.916  0.919 
Eagle Ford    
Rig Countt-1  0.152 (0.06)**   0.153 (0.02)*** 
Producing Wells   1.525 (0.05)***  1.530 (0.04)*** 
Feb 2009  0.838 (0.12)*** -0.235 (0.05)*** -0.337 (0.04)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.379  0.931  0.937 
Haynesville    
Rig Countt-1  0.077 (0.02)***   0.160 (0.03)*** 
Producing Wells   0.177 (0.14)  0.771 (0.17)*** 
Feb 2009  0.653 (0.05)***  0.490 (0.08)***  0.391 (0.07)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.587  0.571  0.638 
Niobrara     
Rig Countt-1  0.011 (0.01)   0.010 (0.02) 
Producing Wells   -0.023 (0.03) -0.028 (0.03) 
Feb 2009  0.122 (0.02)***   0.136 (0.02)  0.138 (0.02)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.363   0.382  0.203 
Permian    
Rig Countt-1 -0.006 (0.05)  -0.121 (0.04)*** 
Producing Wells   1.255 (0.12)***  1.390 (0.13)*** 
Feb 2009  0.172 (0.06)*** -0.387 (0.07)*** -0.408 (0.07)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.051  0.457  0.497 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018 
In some of the regions, rig count has a negative coefficient as natural gas production increased 
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despite the declining number of active rigs. The estimated adjusted R-squared varies among regions 
and between models. However, in all cases, Models 2 and 3, which include the number of producing 
wells, show better fits compared to Model 1. The rig count is a significant indicator for natural gas 
production in some regions. However, in most regions the rig count is not as informative as the 
number of producing wells, which accounts for well completions. Similar conclusions are reached in 
the models with heterogeneous break points across regions (see Table 3.A3 in the Appendix). 
In Table 13, I show the results from the regression where new wells are separated from older 
(legacy) wells. In this model, new wells represent cumulative number of wells that started producing 
up to three months ago. New well completions reflect the effect of higher initial productivity of new 
wells and have a statistically significant effect44. The new wells contribute to total gas production only 
after completion, which can be delayed indefinitely after drilling. The delays in completion weaken the 
correspondence between drilling rates and aggregate gas production. Hence, well completion decisions 
have a significant impact on aggregate natural gas production following the growth in UOG 
production. The conclusions are robust with heterogeneous breakpoints across regions (see Table 
3.A4 in the Appendix). 
Table 13: Regional and Time Fixed Effects Regression Results (NGP and New Wells) 
Dependent – ΔNGP Log-log form 
Legacy Wells -0.012 (0.00)*** 
New Wells  0.009 (0.00)*** 
Feb 2009  0.042 (0.02)*** 
Constant  0.070 (0.03)** 
R-sq  0.26 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets 
 
 
44I also estimated the model where new wells include those that have started producing longer than three months ago.  The results, available upon 
request, confirm declining productivity after approximately a year.   
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Next, I turn to the panel vector autoregressive models. First, I perform several diagnostic tests. 
Unit root tests indicate that all variables are non-stationary in levels at the regional and aggregate scales. 
However, I reject the null hypothesis that the differenced variables contain a unit root at 1% 
significance level (see Table 3.A5 in the Appendix for the first-differenced variables, with and without 
a trend).  I use a lag length of four as determined by HQC test (see Table 3.A6 in the Appendix) in 
estimating the autoregressive models. The Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel cointegration test is used to 
determine the long-run relationships between variables (see Table 3.A7 in the Appendix), and indicates 
that panel rho-statistic, panel PP statistic, group rho-statistics and group PP-statistics fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 0.1 significance level45. However, panel ADF t-statistic and 
group ADF-statistics reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level. Conversely, the Johansen 
test for cointegration (Johansen, 1988, 1995a, b) reveals cointegration within regions between some 
of the variables in the specifications (see Appendix Table 3.A8). Therefore, I reject the null of zero 
co-integrating vectors within regions using the trace statistic and conclude that there is at least one co-
integrating vector in the specifications, which include natural gas production (NGP), rig count (RC) 
and producing wells (PW).   
The results for the panel vector autoregressive models with regional fixed effects are presented 
in the Appendix (see Table 3.A9). The rig count is statistically not significant in the first three models. 
On the other hand, the lagged number of producing wells is significant. I also estimate the Vector 
Error Correction model with NGP as a function of RC and PW for each region. Results are presented 
in the Appendix section (see Table 3.A10). The rig count has a statistically insignificant effect in three 
of the seven regions. In Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara and Permian regions, the rig count has a 
 
45The panel VEC estimation follows two steps. First is the estimation of long run relationship using the following model, 𝑌𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛿𝑘𝑡 +
∑  𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡, to obtain the estimated residuals 𝑘𝑡 which form the error correction term in the panel VEC model (see Jiang and Liu, 2014). 
In the second step, equation 1 is estimated as a panel VAR with the error correction term. 
90 
 
negative and significant coefficient indicating growth in natural gas production despite a declining 
number of active rigs. This is consistent with the previous results and with the report by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas (2019). These results suggest that well productivity and the number of 
producing wells, which depends on well completion rates, are important determinants of natural gas 
production.  
Overall, the results show that there is a significant relationship between the cumulative number 
of producing wells and natural gas production. However, the strength of the relationship differs across 
regions. In comparison, the drilling rig count is statistically weaker in explaining natural gas 
production. Delays in unconventional well completions, and growth in the number of DUCs, have 
introduced an additional layer of disparity between drilling rig count and natural gas production. I 
examine the determinants of the number of DUCs in the next section. 
3.4.2. DUCs Analysis 
Region and time fixed effects models are used to examine the number of DUCs as a function 
of pipeline capacity (Cap), rig count (RC), and natural gas and oil futures prices (FP). The results in 
Table 14 are consistent with expectations. I observe that futures prices of natural gas and oil have 
statistically significant and negative effects on the number of DUC numbers. When futures prices are 
high, more wells are completed, and DUC numbers decline. This result is consistent with operators 
selling at favorable prices to cover well completion costs by taking advantage of high initial well 
production rates. With futures and forward contracts locked in, the operators attract investors to front 
the money needed for well completion. This result supports the insight that operators defer well 
completions, leading to high DUC numbers, in anticipation of better oil and natural gas prices 




Table 14: Drilled and Un-Completed Well Analysis Regional Regression Results 
 Region  
Fixed Effects 
Region and Time  
Fixed Effects  
DUC - dependent A. Log-log  B. Log-log   C. Variables 
standardized across 
regions 
D. Variables  
standardized by 
region 
Pipeline Capacity 1.668 (0.86)    0.329 (0.17)  0.232 (0.24) 
ΔPipeline Capacity -  2.274 (1.73) - - 
Rig Countt-1  0.448 (0.10)***  0.585 (0.14)***  0.485 (0.11)***  0.412 (0.09)*** 
NG Future Price -0.213 (0.14) -2.337 (0.69)** -0.636 (0.16)*** -1.493 (0.73)* 
Oil Future Price -0.031 (0.15) -4.112 (1.01)*** -0.765 (0.16)*** -1.841 (0.86)* 
Time  0.007 (0.00)**     
Constant -11.75 (8.71)  24.34 (4.48)*** -0.218 (0.13) -1.008 (0.39)** 
Adj R-sq  0.717  0.735  0.792  0.721 
Observations  966  966  966  966 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Robust standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018 
Region fixed effects regression results show that pipeline infrastructure is not a statistically 
significant factor in explaining DUC numbers46. Statistical insignificance of pipeline capacity in these 
models can be due to a lack of variability in pipeline capacity within each region over time. The 
individual region results in Table 15 confirm the results from the aggregate analysis.  
Table 15: OLS Log-log Regression Results for DUC Well Analysis per Region 
Dep- DUC counts Anadarko Appalachia Bakken Eagle Ford Haynesville Niobrara Permian 
ΔPipeline Capacity -0.832  
(0.35) 
















 0.278 *** 
(0.07) 






 0.354 *** 
(0.03) 






































 8.302***  
(0.27) 
 7.937 *** 
(0.23) 
R-sq  0.740  0.747  0.728  0.831  0.634  0.532  0.720 
Observations  138  138  138  138  138  138  138 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2007-2018 
 
46I also estimated a regional and time fixed effects regression model using first differences of the explanatory variables. The results show significant 
negative effect of oil and gas futures prices on DUC growth. However, pipeline capacity and drilling activity are not significant. These results are 
available on request.   
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Table 15 show that rig count and futures prices have positive and negative effects on DUC 
numbers, respectively. The results also show that, as one would expect, an increase in drilling activity, 
measured in terms of the number of active drilling rigs, has a statistically significant and positive effect 
on the number of DUCs. All else constant, greater drilling activities lead to a greater number of DUCs. 
3.4.3. DUC Status Duration Analysis  
Next, I examine the length of time that operators take to complete each unconventional well. 
I use the well level DUC duration status data to examine completion timing. Non-parametric survival 
functions are presented in Figure 9 using data from 2000 to 2018. The Kaplan-Meier survival curves 
show the proportion of wells that remain uncompleted over time. Most wells (about 90%) are 
completed within a year. An insignificant number of outlier DUCs (about 0.3%) remain uncompleted 
after five years. In this study, such wells are treated as “dead”47 DUCs and are excluded from the 
regression analyses.  
 
Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier survival curves 
 
47 Example of such definition can be found in Andrien (2016) where “dead” DUCs are defined as wells which fail to be completed even at better 





























Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates
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I use linear regression and time-to-event (survival) models to obtain statistical estimates for 
the factors that explain the length of time taken to complete drilled wells. The generalized linear model 
is used to illustrate the general baseline relationship between DUC duration and the explanatory 
variables. However, survival analysis is more appropriate to represent the duration data adequately 
and to provide a more detailed account using both the survival and hazard functions. The survival 
function represents the probability that a well remains uncompleted at any given time, while the hazard 
function gives the probability that a well will be completed in a given period assuming that it has not 
yet been completed.  
The Results for the generalized linear (column A) and semi-parametric Cox proportional 
(columns B and C) models with logged days of DUC duration status are presented in Table 16. Cross 
region variation is captured using dummy variables with Anadarko as the base category. Generalized 
linear model results show that all variables are statistically significant with expected signs. Pipeline 
capacity, natural gas and oil futures prices have statistically significant and negative effects on the 
duration of the DUC status48. On the other hand, well depth has a positive effect on DUC duration. 
Interpretation of the coefficients in the Cox proportional survival model (column B) should be 
opposite of the estimated signs (see Teachman and Hayward, 1993 for interpretation of hazard 
models). A positive coefficient indicates a negative effect on the probability that a well remains 
uncompleted (longer DUC duration). For example, the results show that an increase in natural gas 
and oil prices decreases the probability that a well will remain uncompleted at any given time, which 
implies a decrease in DUC duration status. On the other hand, the length of the unconventional well 
has a positive effect on the duration of DUC status. Similarly, I observe that from 2000 to 2018, the 
probability that an unconventional well remains uncompleted at any given time has increased.  
 
48Pipeline capacity limitations have been especially prominent in the Permian basin leading to negative natural gas prices and increase in the number 
of DUCs (Addison, 2018; Surran, 2019).  
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The coefficient estimates for the hazard rates (the probability that a well will be completed at 
time t given that the well has not been completed prior to t) in column C are consistent with the 
estimates from the linear regression model results (column A) and prior expectations.  
Table 16: DUC Duration Analysis Results 
Variables Generalized linear model Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Model 
Dep-DUC Duration A. Coef. B. Coef.  C. Hazard Ratio  
LL -139760 -1346626 -1401168 
LR Chi2(12)   20062 (0.00)  20062 (0.00) 
NG Future Price -0.041 (0.01)***  0.052 (0.01)***  1.053 (0.01)** 
Oil Future Price -0.051 (0.01)***  0.118 (0.01)***  1.126 (0.01)*** 
Pipeline Capacity -0.502 (0.03)***  1.013 (0.05)***  2.753 (0.13)*** 
Gas Well49  0.232 (0.01)*** -0.269 (0.01)***  0.764 (0.01)*** 
Well Measured Depth  0.498 (0.01)*** -0.350 (0.01)***  0.705 (0.00)*** 
Time  0.0001(0.00)*** -0.0002(0.00)***  0.999 (0.00)*** 
Appalachia  1.477 (0.03)*** -1.960 (0.04)***  0.141 (0.01)*** 
Bakken -0.320 (0.03)***  0.651 (0.04)***  1.917 (0.08)*** 
Eagle Ford -0.225 (0.03)***  0.594 (0.05)***  1.811 (0.09)*** 
Haynesville  0.544 (0.03)*** -1.061 (0.04)***  0.346 (0.02)*** 
Niobrara  0.621 (0.01)*** -0.869 (0.02)***  0.419 (0.01)*** 
Permian  0.288 (0.01)*** -0.411 (0.01)***  0.663 (0.01)*** 
Observations  126,048  127,627  127,627 
Number of Completions  126,048  126,048  126,048 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets; Data from 2000-2018 
A hazard ratio coefficient greater (less) than one indicates that a unit increase in the covariate 
is associated with an increase (decrease) in the probability that a well will be completed at any given 
time t, given that it is still in DUC status at time t-1. For example, using the estimates from column C, 
all else constant, a one dollar increase in natural gas price is associated with 5.3% increase in the hazard 
rate. Similarly, a unit (103 mmcfd) increase in pipeline capacity is associated with 175% increase in 
hazard rate, on average across regions. This result illustrates the significance of pipeline infrastructure 
 
49Gas well is a dummy variable (with 1=Natural Gas producing well and 0=Oil producing well) that captures production 
type as defined by operator. Wells are classified based on their gas/oil ratio (GOR).  
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for unconventional well completion decisions. On the other hand, a unit (103 ft) increase in the well 
depth of an unconventional well is associated with 0.295% (1-0.705) decrease in hazard rate.  
The results also show that both survival and hazard rates differ significantly across regions and 
that gas wells are more likely to have lengthier DUC periods than primarily oil producing wells. This 
result, in combination with the significance of pipeline capacity, is possibly indicative of more pressing 
pipeline bottlenecks in natural gas supply than in oil. I also observe that well depth has a negative 
effect on the probability of completion at any given time. These results, in general, suggest that prices, 
infrastructure, and geologic variables play important roles in operators’ decisions to complete 
unconventional gas wells. This is consistent with the results in recent literature where prices and 
geologic factors are reported to be significant determinants of unconventional oil and gas production 
decisions (Mason and Roberts, 2018; Kleinberg et al., 2018; Ikonnikova and Gülen, 2015).  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The US natural gas production industry has experienced tremendous growth in the recent 
decade due to the developments in unconventional oil and gas extraction technologies. This growth 
has affected domestic and international energy markets (Oglend, et al., 2016), electricity generation 
sector (Peters and Hertel, 2017; Logan et al., 2013), industrial manufacturing sectors (Arora and 
Lieskovsky, 2014) and labor markets (Agerton, et al., 2017). Therefore, it is important to identify key 
interdependencies in the natural gas industry for appropriate market analysis and effective policy 
formulation. The objective of this study is to explain the observed variability in the US natural gas 
output in terms of the drilling rig count, the number of producing wells, and the completion of drilled 
unconventional wells. I am particularly interested in the observed growth of the number and duration 
of DUCs in recent years, given a significant increase in unconventional production.  
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I find that since the expansion in shale gas production, the explanatory power of rig count has 
declined, while the effect of the number of producing wells remained statistically significant. 
Therefore, new wells and completion of drilled wells are important determinants of natural gas output. 
The decline in the significance of rig counts as a determinant is expected given the nature of UOG 
production technology, where extraction requires hydraulic fracturing as an additional step, which can 
be delayed indefinitely. Hence, unless delays in well completion are constant across wells, the 
explanatory power of rig counts is expected to decline. Indeed, I observe heterogeneity in the delay of 
well completions and an overall increase in the number of DUCs. As a result, the statistical significance 
of rig counts has diminished as completion decisions have become important determinants of natural 
gas output.   
The results show that rig count and futures prices have statistically significant effects on the 
number of DUCs. Aggregate, as well as region-specific results indicate that an increase in the natural 
gas futures prices decreases the number of DUCs. This suggests that all else constant, increase in 
natural gas prices motivates operators to complete existing drilled wells sooner.  An increase in the 
price of natural gas futures decreases the probability that a well remains uncompleted and increases 
the probability that a well will be completed assuming it has not yet been completed. This result is 
consistent with producers hedging gas production to take advantage of high initial well productivity. 
Forward contracts and futures markets with favorable prices enable producers to pay off well 
completion costs faster and attract needed investment to finance well completion.    
The duration model also shows that pipeline capacity has a negative effect on the duration of 
DUC status. This result confirms the effect of pipeline infrastructure bottlenecks in natural gas 
markets.  While the effect of pipeline bottlenecks on natural gas prices has been recognized (Oliver et 
al., 2014), I show that pipeline capacity has a direct positive effect on the completion of drilled 
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unconventional wells using data from multiple shale regions. the results are consistent with the 
observed negative effects of pipeline constrains on completion rates and associated negative impacts 
on the demand for sand, water, and fracking fleet capacity as reported in industry outlets (Davis, 2018; 
Andrien, 2016).  
It is important to note that this study does not explicitly address the simultaneity of output, 
inventories, and prices. This study is the first to draw attention to the role of well completion in 
unconventional gas production as a factor in aggregate output. the objectives for the models of 
aggregate natural gas production is to point to the diminished power of rig counts and the increased 
role of completion decisions. I refrain from also addressing the identification issues and from claiming 
causal inference involving aggregate natural gas supply and prices. Future studies should examine 
supply of natural gas considering endogeneity of prices and inventory to support a proper causal 
inference for supply. In the analysis of DUC duration, I include prices as one of the factors affecting 
the timing of well completion decisions. In the well level analysis, causal inferences pertaining to prices 
and well level completion decisions are not as susceptible to the inconsistency of estimates that may 
be caused by price endogeneity. For individual well completion modeling, price can be reasonably 
treated as an exogenous factor.     
The results of this study are important for natural gas operators, energy market analysts, 
government agencies and other stakeholders in the natural gas industry. Investors, operators, market 
analysts and policy makers rely on natural gas production information to support investment 
strategies, facilitate production decisions, improve market analysis, and formulate regulatory policies. 
Thus, it is important to have access to the best available information about the primary determinants 
of natural gas production. EIA produces a monthly report (Drilling Productivity Report) which uses 
data on drilling rig counts, drilling productivity and production in natural gas wells to develop regional 
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forecasts of natural gas production. In this study, I show that the information about drilled but 
uncompleted wells can be meaningful for improving such projections.  
I also show that infrastructure constraints, like pipeline bottlenecks, can have important 
implications for well completion decisions and natural gas output in the US. The implications of such 
bottlenecks are important for coordinating increasingly interdependent electricity and natural gas 
markets (Mugabe et al., 2020) considering reliability (Moeller, 2012; US Department of Energy, 2015). 
Increased availability of shale gas has transformed the US power sector (Mugabe et al., 2020; Kerr, 
2010; Rogers, 2011), and future developments in natural gas distribution infrastructure will likely have 
further implications for US power generation sector (Logan et al., 2013). Future analysis should 
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Table 3.A1: Split Sample Regional Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP 
Dependent – NGP Before Break(i) After Break(i) 
Rig Countt-1 0.461 (0.02)*** -0.080 (0.02)*** 
Constant 12.47 (0.12)***  15.97 (0.07)*** 
R-sq 0.45  0.05 
Observations n=7, N=444  n=7, N=522 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets 
Table 3.A2: Region and Time Fixed Effects Results for Aggregate NGP 
NGP-Dep Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Rig Countt-1  0.298 (0.03)***   0.247 (0.03)*** 
Producing Wells  0.512 (0.04)***  0.467 (0.04)*** 
Break(i)  0.427 (0.05)*** 0.423 (0.05)***  0.378 (0.05)*** 
Constant  13.10 (0.22)*** 10.01 (0.40)***  9.266 (0.40)*** 
R-sq  0.61 0.64  0.66 
Observations             Balanced Panel n=7, T=138, N=966 




Table 3.A3: Regional Regression Results (Determinants of NGP) 
Region Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Anadarko    
Rig Countt-1 -0.084 (0.02)***  -0.020 (0.02) 
Producing Wells   0.510 (0.08)***  0.484 (0.09)*** 
B1 May 2010  0.259 (0.03)***  0.084 (0.03)***  0.097 (0.03)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.543  0.618  0.614 
Appalachia    
Rig Countt-1  0.421 (0.10)***   0.180 (0.09)* 
Producing Wells   2.114 (0.30)***  1.902 (0.30)*** 
B2 August 2012  1.972 (0.08)***  1.501 (0.09)***  1.551 (0.09)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.831  0.871  0.871 
Bakken    
Rig Countt-1 0.121 (0.05)**  -0.060 (0.02)*** 
Producing Wells   0.676 (0.02)***  0.711 (0.02)*** 
B3 December 2012  1.597 (0.15)***  0.377 (0.05)***  0.311 (0.05)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.814  0.974  0.976 
Eagle Ford    
Rig Countt-1  0.238 (0.03)**   0.147 (0.02)*** 
Producing Wells   1.072 (0.06)***  0.921 (0.06)*** 
B4 February 2013  1.044 (0.04)***  0.292 (0.06)***  0.381 (0.04)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.873  0.933  0.958 
Haynesville    
Rig Countt-1  0.077 (0.02)***   0.160 (0.03)*** 
Producing Wells   0.177 (0.14)  0.771 (0.17)*** 
B5 February 2009  0.653 (0.05)***  0.490 (0.08)***  0.391 (0.07)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.587  0.571  0.638 
Niobrara     
Rig Countt-1 -0.046 (0.01)***   -0.034 (0.01)*** 
Producing Wells   0.184 (0.02)***  0.161 (0.02)*** 
B6 January 2014 -0.015 (0.01) -0.066 (0.02)*** -0.077 (0.02)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.061  0.284  0.283 
Permian    
Rig Countt-1 -0.019 (0.03)  -0.011 (0.03) 
Producing Wells  -0.073 (0.07)  -0.065 (0.08) 
B7 January 2014  0.462 (0.02)***  0.484 (0.04)***  0.481 (0.03)*** 
Adj R-sq  0.750  0.752  0.749 






Table 3.A4: Region and Time Fixed Effects Results (NGP and New Wells) 
Dependent – ΔNGP Log-log form 
Legacy Wells -0.012 (0.00)*** 
New Wells  0.009 (0.00)*** 
Break(i)  0.002 (0.02) 
Constant  0.072 (0.03)** 
R-sq  0.26 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets 
 
Table 3.A5: Unit Root Tests 
Note: Significance levels ***1%; **5%; *10% 
 With trend Without trend With trend Without trend 
Variables Phillips-Perron Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Regional Aggregate 
ΔNG Production -50.060*** -48.412*** -35.003*** -34.928*** 
ΔRig Count -5.636*** -5.629*** -5.087*** -5.085*** 
ΔNG Futures price -12.862*** -12.866*** -12.903*** -12.903*** 
ΔOil Futures prices -5.621*** -5.617*** -7.071*** -7.094*** 
 Levin-Lin-Chu Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Anadarko 
ΔRig Count -4.987*** -4.985***  -4.912***  -4.929*** 
ΔNG Production -12.601*** -12.451***  -12.412***  -12.311*** 
ΔProducing Wells 96.47 63.152 -18.883*** -18.164*** 
Appalachia 
ΔRig Count -5.702*** -5.585***  -5.617***  -5.522*** 
ΔNG Production -8.416*** -7.270***  -8.290***  -7.188*** 
ΔProducing Wells -14.339*** -12.918*** -19.903*** -19.919*** 
Bakken 
ΔRig Count -4.820*** -4.679***  -4.747***  -4.626*** 
ΔNG Production -10.783*** -10.031***  -10.620***  -9.918*** 
ΔProducing Wells 157.528 126.49 2.733 2.262 
Eagle Ford 
ΔRig Count -4.860*** -4.758***  -4.786***  -4.705*** 
ΔNG Production -5.759*** -5.758***  -5.672***  -5.693*** 
ΔProducing Wells 3.407 1.672 -9.951*** -9.76*** 
Haynesville 
ΔRig Count -4.813*** -4.800***  -4.741***  -4.746*** 
ΔNG Production  -4.571***  -4.565***  -4.502***  -4.514*** 
ΔProducing Wells        -17.226*** -6.157*** -9.597*** -8.984*** 
Niobrara 
ΔRig Count -5.781*** -5.776***  -5.694***  -5.711*** 
ΔNG Production -8.550*** -8.428***  -8.421***  -8.333*** 
ΔProducing Wells 30.459 23.813 -21.602*** -20.942*** 
Permian 
ΔRig Count -4.185*** -4.182***  -4.122**  -4.135*** 
ΔNG Production  -9.870***  -8.215***  -9.721***  -8.122*** 






Table 3.A6: Variable Lag Length 
Series→ NGP & RC NGP & PW NGP, RC & PW 












Anadarko 4 (-7.13) 3 (-6.99) 4 (-7.79) 4 (-7.61) 4 (-10.70) 3(-10.36) 
Appalachia 3 (-7.14) 2 (-7.02) 4 (-5.87) 1 (-5.75) 2 (-8.94) 2(-8.75) 
Bakken 3 (-6.57) 2 (-6.45) 1 (-4.00) 1 (-3.93) 3(-6.76) 2(-6.57) 
Eagle Ford 2 (-7.14) 2 (-7.03) 4 (-9.20) 4 (-9.03) 4 (-11.54) 4 (-11.20) 
Haynesville 2 (-7.22) 2 (-7.12) 4 (-10.03) 4 (-9.85) 3 (-12.29) 3 (-12.03) 
Niobrara 2 (-7.69) 2 (-7.58) 2 (-7.90) 2 (-7.79) 2 (-10.26) 2 (-10.07) 
Permian 2 (-7.30) 2 (-7.19) 2 (-7.80) 2 (-7.69) 2 (-10.85) 2 (-10.66) 
AIC/HQIC level in parenthesis 
 
 
Table 3.A7: Pedroni Panel Test for Cointegration 
Test Statistic Panel  Statistics Group Statistics 
V -1.782 (1.93) . 
Rho -7.322 (2.00) -17.73 (2.00) 
PP -3.066 (2.00) -5.013 (2.00) 
Adf  2.084 (0.04)**  2.084 (0.01)*** 
Note: P-values in parenthesis; Significance levels ***1%; **5%; *10% 
 
 
Table 3.A8: Johansen Test for Cointegration 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 NGP & RC NGP & PW NGP, RC & PW 
Region Rank  Rank  Rank  
Anadarko 0 (6.97)* 0 (13.44)* 2 (0.59)* 
Appalachia 1 (2.76)* 1 (2.15)* 2 (3.22)* 
Bakken 1 (1.66)* 0 (10.12)* 1 (11.99)* 
Eagle Ford 1 (2.31)* 0 (10.33)* 1 (6.23)* 
Haynesville 1 (3.57)* 0 (13.98)* 1 (12.82)* 
Niobrara 0 (14.47)* 1 (1.17)* 0 (22.86)* 
Permian 1 (3.25)* 1 (0.01)* 1 (6.24)* 











Table 3.A9: Region Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Model Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ΔNatural Gas Production    
LD -0.012 (0.04) -0.013 (0.04) -0.021 (0.04) -0.038 (0.04) 
L2D   0.067 (0.04)  0.072 (0.04)*  0.063 (0.04) 
L3D    0.150 (0.04)***  0.157 (0.04)*** 
L4D     0.114 (0.04)*** 
ΔRig Count    
LD 0.002 (0.01) -0.010 (0.02) -0.009 (0.02) -0.009 (0.02) 
L2D   0.021 (0.02)  0.015 (0.02)  0.014 (0.02) 
L3D    0.010 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01) 
     0.025 (0.01)** 
ΔProducing Wells    
LD 0.036 (0.02)** 0.040 (0.02)**  0.034 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02) 
L2D  0.006 (0.02)  0.010 (0.02) -0.003 (0.03) 
L3D    0.005 (0.02) -0.001 (0.02) 
    -0.003 (0.01) 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets 
Table 3.A10: Regional Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model Results 
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R-sq  0.70  0.57  0.49  0.46  0.38  0.59  0.65 
Note: Significance values 1%***, 5%**, 10%*; Standard errors in brackets 
